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INTRODUCTION

North Carolina is one of only four states that continues to
adhere to the contributory negligence doctrine. The contributory
negligence doctrine provides that a plaintiff who is injured by a
defendant whose negligence is a proximate cause of the plaintiff's.
injuries is generally barred from recovery against the defendant
when the plaintiff's negligence is also a proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injuries. Recovery is barred even if the plaintiff's fault
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss1/1
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is very small and the defendant's fault is very large. It is an all-ornothing proposition roundly criticized for its harshness and
unfairness.
The doctrine of comparative negligence-or comparative
fault-was adopted by the forty-six states to repudiate the contributory negligence doctrine. The comparative negligence doctrine provides that a plaintiff may recover against a defendant
whose negligence is a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries
even if the plaintiff's negligence is also a proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injuries; the plaintiff's damages are reduced by the proportionate amount of fault that is attributable to the plaintiff.1
Thus, under the comparative negligence doctrine, both the plaintiff and the defendant bear the amount of loss attributable to
them, instead of one party or the other bearing the entire loss as
under the contributory negligence doctrine.
After examining the contributory and comparative negligence
doctrines, efforts in the North Carolina General Assembly to pass
comparative fault bills, and the North Carolina Supreme Court's
stare decisis jurisprudence, this article concludes that it is time for
North Carolina to reject the contributory negligence doctrine and
adopt the comparative negligence doctrine in its stead. There are
two paths by which North Carolina can progress from a contributory negligence state to a comparative negligence state: legislative and judicial. The legislative path has been well-explored in
North Carolina, particularly during the 1980s. Many comparative
negligence bills have been introduced in the North Carolina General Assembly. Some of these bills died in committee; others
passed in one house only to see defeat in the other. None passed
both houses to become law.
As contributory negligence is a common-law rule-and not a
statutory rule-in North Carolina, the North Carolina Supreme
Court has the ability to repudiate the contributory negligence doctrine for the comparative negligence doctrine. The stare decisis
jurisprudence of the North Carolina Supreme Court indicates that
the court should not adhere to the outmoded contributory negligence doctrine when asked to reject it for the comparative negligence doctrine. Over the past twenty-five years, the courts of
twelve states that had not yet legislatively adopted the comparative negligence doctrine have taken such action.
1. The variations of the comparative negligence doctrine are discussed infra
part III.A.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1996
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Recognizing that the contributory negligence doctrine is a
common-law doctrine, the majority of this article discusses the
doctrine as it relates to the judicial path. Most of the arguments
in favor of adopting the comparative negligence doctrine discussed
in this article in regard to the judicial path apply with equal force
to the legislative path. The legislative path, however, is complicated by lobbyists, day-to-day political trends and trade-offs, and
many other influences. Such non-static factors do not lend themselves to thorough examination in a law review article. Members
of the North Carolina General Assembly will hopefully find this
article useful nonetheless.
There are several excellent law review articles examining the
rejection of the contributory negligence doctrine for the comparative negligence doctrine.2 This article does not seek to repeat their
work. Instead, this article examines the issue in light of North
Carolina's experience and history with the contributory and comparative negligence doctrines.
Part I of this article examines the contributory negligence
doctrine and its history in the United States and North Carolina.
Part II describes some of the criticism levelled at the contributory
negligence doctrine. Part III examines the comparative negligence doctrine, including a-description of the types of comparative
negligence systems, a history of the doctrine, and a look at the
history of comparative negligence bills in the North Carolina General Assembly, concentrating on the several comparative negligence bills introduced in the 1980s and one of the principal
arguments made against the bills. Part IV discusses North Carolina's stare decisis jurisprudence and judicial deference to the legislative branch in relation to the common law of North Carolina
and the contributory negligence doctrine.
2. Some of the most informative articles include Carol A. Mutter, Moving to
ComparativeNegligence in an Era of Tort Reform: Decisions for Tennessee, 57.
TENN. L. REV. 199 (1990); John G. Fleming, ComparativeNegligence at Last-By
Judicial Choice, 64 CAL. L. REV. 239 (1976); Friedrich K. Juenger, Brief for
Negligence Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan in Support of Comparative
Negligence as Amicus Curiae, Parsonson v. Construction Equipment Company,
18 WAYNE L. REV. 3 (1972); Comments on Maki v. Frelk-Comparative v.
Contributory Negligence: Should the Court or Legislature Decide, 21 VAND. L.
REV. 889 (1968) (written by six prominent tort-law commentators) [hereinafter
Commentator's Name, Comments]; William L. Prosser, ComparativeNegligence,
51 MICH. L. REV. 465, 467 (1953); Ernest A. Turk, ComparativeNegligence on the
March, 28 CHI.-KErr L. REV. 189 (1950); and Leon Green, Illinois Negligence
Law, 39 ILL. L. REV. 36 (1944).
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CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE:

STANDARDS, RATIONALE

AND LIMITATIONS

Contributory negligence is a defense asserted in a negligence
action.3 The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines contributory
negligence as "conduct on the part of the plaintiff which falls
below the standard to which he should conform for his own protection, and which is a legally contributing cause co-operating with
the negligence of the defendant in bringing about the plaintiff's
harm."4
In a contributory negligence jurisdiction such as North Carolina, a contributorily negligent plaintiff generally may not succeed
in an action against a defendant whose negligence is also a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, even if the plaintiff's fault is
comparatively small and the defendant's fault is comparatively
large. 5 This part discusses the history of the contributory negligence doctrine, concentrating on its development in North
Carolina.
A.

Development of the Contributory Negligence Doctrine and
Associated Standards in North Carolina

The first recognized contributory negligence case is an 1809
6 In Butterfield, the plaintiff
English case, Butterfield v. Forrester.
departed an inn at dusk on horseback and travelled very quickly
down a public road.7 He did not get. far, however. The defendant,
making repairs on his house, had obstructed the road with a pole.'
The plaintiff rode too fast to see and avoid the obstruction, and
sustained injuries in the ensuing collision.'
The plaintiff sought redress in court, but was denied recovery.
The presiding Lord Ellenborough explained: "One person being in
fault will not dispense with another's using ordinary care for himself. Two things must concur to support this action, an obstruction in the road by the fault of the defendant, and no want of
3. See generally W. PAGE
(5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988).

KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS

4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965).
5. See generally CHARLES E. DAYE & MARK W. MORRIS, NORTH CAROLINA
LAW OF TORTS § 19 (1991).

6.
7.
8.
9.

103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809).
Id. at 926-27.
Id. at 926.
Id. at 926-27.
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ordinary care to avoid it on the part of the plaintiff."10 This statement is commonly recognized as the origination of the contributory negligence doctrine."
The first American case recognizing contributory negligence
is an 1824 Massachusetts case, Smith v. Smith. 1 2 Other Ameri13
can courts, citing Butterfield, quickly accepted the doctrine.
The North Carolina Supreme Court first recognized the contributory negligence doctrine in dictum in 1849. In Herring v.
Wilmington & Raleigh Railroad, 4 the defendant's train hit two of
the plaintiff's slaves, who may have been asleep, killing one and
badly wounding the other. 1 5 The plaintiff brought an action
against the defendant and lost at trial.' 6 On appeal, the supreme
court stated that the defendant's engineer reasonably assumed
that the slaves would move, and concluded that the defendant was
not negligent. 17 Thus, the court found it unnecessary to reach the
issue "as to the damage done, when there was negligence on both
sides."' s The court stated in dictum, however, that "[w]e concur in
the opinion that, [when there is negligence on both sides], neither
party can recover, unless one be guilty of... gross neglect."' 9 The
court reasoned that "if both are in equal fault, if one can recover,
so can the other, and thus there would be mutual faults and
mutual recoveries, which would contradict the saying, 'that law is
the perfection of reason.' "20
The North Carolina Supreme Court first applied the contribu21
tory negligence doctrine in an 1869 case, Morrison v. Cornelius.
In Morrison, the defendants maintained a saltpetre2 2 manufacturing business on property near land where the plaintiff raised cat10. Id. at 927.
11. See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 2, at 467. Some commentators, however,
reason that the doctrine developed much earlier. See, e.g., Wex S. Malone, The
Formative Era of ContributoryNegligence, 41 ILL. L. REV. 151, 151 (1946).
12. 19 Mass. 621 (1824) (citing Butterfield, 103 Eng. Rep. at 926).
13. HENRY WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT § 1.3 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1995).
14. 32 N.C. 402 (1849).
15. Id. at 402.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 408-09.
18. Id. at 409.
19. Id.
20. Id.

21. 63 N.C. 346 (1869).
22. Saltpetre, or saltpeter, is potassium nitrate or sodium nitrate.
1601 (2d ed. 1979).

WEBSTER'S

NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY
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tle.23 During the Civil War, the defendants ceased their business
and moved their equipment into storage. 24 The defendants, however, left several large containers which contained poisonous liquid on their property. 25 Approximately three months after the
defendants ceased operation, seven of the plaintiff's cattle were
found dead near the containers.26
The plaintiff sought the value of his cattle in court.2 7 The jury
found for the plaintiff and the defendants appealed. Reversing,
the North Carolina Supreme Court stated a "general rule" which
is cited as the first recognition of the contributory negligence doc28
trine in North Carolina:
In all cases where a person, in the lawful use of his own property,
causes injury to another, the party injured, before he can recover
damages at law, must show that he has exercised proper care, and
is free from blame in regard to the matter. If it appears that the
party injured has, by any act of omission or commission on his
part, contributed to the injury complained of, it is generally
damnum absque injuria.29

Damnum absque injuria means "[a] loss or injury which does not
30
give rise to an action for damages against the person causing it."

The supreme court's statement of the contributory negligence
doctrine has not materially varied from the original Morrison
statement. Later North Carolina courts summarized the contributory negligence doctrine as:
Every person having the capacity to exercise ordinary care for his
own safety against injury is required by law to do so, and if he fails
to exercise such care, and such failure, concurring and cooperating
23. Morrison, 63 N.C. at 347.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 347-48.
26. Id.

27. Id. at 346-47.
28. Id. at 348. Recent cases citing Morrison as such include Bowden v. Bell,
116 N.C. App. 64, 67, 446 S.E.2d 816, 819 (1994); Bosley v. Alexander, 114 N.C.
App. 470, 471, 442 S.E.2d 82, 83 (1994); and Corns v.Hall, 112 N.C. App. 232,
237, 435 S.E.2d 88, 90 (1993).
As Herring'sdiscussion of contributory negligence is dictum, see supra notes
14-20 and accompanying text, Morrison is the appropriately cited precedent for
the contributory negligence doctrine in North Carolina.
29. Morrison, 63 N.C. at 348-49. The court noted that there are some
exceptions to this general rule "founded upon particular circumstances," but did
not elaborate. Id. at 349 (citing Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Ad. & E. (N.S.) 422 (1841);
Birge v. Gardner, 19 Conn. 507 (1849)).
30. BLAcK's LAw DIcTIoNARY 393 (6th ed. 1991).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1996

7

Campbell
Law Review, Vol.
18, Iss.
1 [1996], Art. 1
CAMPBELL
LAW
REVIEW

[Vol. 18:1

with the actionable negligence of defendant, contributes to3 1the
injury complained of, he is guilty of contributory negligence.

Over time, the supreme court developed rules and standards
for applying the contributory negligence doctrine. The court
explained that there is no material difference between "negligence" and "contributory negligence."3 2 Contributory negligence,
the court observed, is merely a term used to describe the negligence of the plaintiff.3 3

In Lambeth v. North CarolinaRailroad,3 4 decided three years
after Morrison, the supreme court expounded on the definition of
the "proper care" that a plaintiff must exercise to avoid being
barred from recovery under the contributory negligence doctrine.3 5 The Lambeth court stated that the appropriate inquiry is
whether the plaintiff exercised "ordinary care under the circumstances."36 Ordinary care, the court explained, is the "degree of
care which may have been reasonably expected from a sensible
person in the situation of the" plaintiff.37 Later courts described a
"sensible person" as an "ordinarily prudent person." 38

Later

courts explained also that such care does not require persons to
anticipate the negligence of others.3 9
From the first appearance of the contributory negligence doctrine in North Carolina, North Carolina courts ruled that a plaintiff can be barred by the contributory negligence doctrine only if
the plaintiff's negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's
31. Clark v. Roberts, 263 N.C. 336, 343, 139 S.E.2d 593, 597 (1965).
32. See Liske v. Walton, 198 N.C. 741, 742, 153 S.E. 318, 319 (1930); Moore v.
Chicago Bridge & Iron Works, 183 N.C. 438, 439-40, 111 S.E. 776, 777 (1922).
33. See Adams v. Board of Educ., 248 N.C. 506, 511, 103 S.E.2d 854, 857
(1958) ("an act or omission on the part of the plaintiff amounting to a want of
ordinary care concurring and cooperating with some negligent act or omission on
the part of the defendant as makes the act or omission of the plaintiff a
proximate cause or occasion of the injury complained of").
34. 66 N.C. 494 (1872).
35. Recall that Morrison provided that the plaintiff must have exercised
"proper care." See supra footnote 29 and accompanying text.
36. Lambeth, 66 N.C. at 499.
37. Id.; see also Asbury v. Charlotte Elec. R.R., Light & Power Co., 125 N.C.
568, 575-76, 34 S.E. 654, 657 (1899).
38. See, e.g., Smith v. Fiber Controls Corp., 300 N.C. 669, 673, 268 S.E.2d 504,
507 (1980) (citation omitted); Adams v. Beaty Serv. Co., 237 N.C. 136, 141, 74
S.E.2d 332, 336 (1953).
39. See, e.g., Reeves v. Staley, 220 N.C. 573, 583, 18 S.E.2d 239, 246 (1942)
(citations omitted); Murray v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 218 N.C. 392, 401, 11
S.E.2d 326, 332-33 (1940) (citations omitted).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss1/1
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injuries.4" Proximate cause in this situation "means [that] the
plaintiff's conduct must have been a factual cause of the injuries,
and that the risk of the harm to the plaintiff must have been reasonably foreseeable." 4 '
B.

The North CarolinaSupreme Court's Rationale for the
ContributoryNegligence Doctrine

The Morrison court cited no authority and offered no rationale for the court's pronouncement of the contributory negligence
rule. Later North Carolina Supreme Court opinions sought to
offer some justification for the rule.
An 1876 case, Manly v. Wilmington & Weldon Railroad,4 2
provides the most substantive explanation of the rule's rationale
given by the supreme court. Nevertheless, the explanation provided therein is scant. The Manly court explained that when the
plaintiff's injury arises from both the plaintiff's and the defendant's non-malicious negligence, "the negligence of both being the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury, a recovery is denied
upon the ground that the injured party must be taken to have
brought the injury upon himself."4 3 The supreme court further
expounded on this rationale in Bessent v. Southern Railway.44
The Bessent court stated that "the law adjudges any injuries [a
40. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Johnson, 303 N.C. 126, 131, 277 S.E.2d 347, 351
(1981) (citations omitted); Farmer v. Wilmington & Weldon R.R., 88 N.C. 564,
570 (1883); Manly v. Wilmington & Weldon R.R., 74 N.C. 655, 658 (1876).
This requirement yielded an early rule: If the plaintiff's negligence is only a
remote cause of a plaintiff's injuries, contributory negligence is not a bar to a
plaintiff's recovery. See Doggett v. Richmond & Danville R.R., 78 N.C. 305, 307
(1878). A remote cause isgenerally some act or omission of the plaintiff's which
does not occur at the same time as the plaintiff's injuries. See, e.g., Manly, 74
N.C. at 660. Remote contributory negligence can have another role in negligence
law. See, e.g., Mutter, supra note 2, at 214-27 (describing remote contributory
negligence in Tennessee).
41. DAYE & MORRIS, supra note 5, § 19.21.31.
42. 74 N.C. 655 (1876).
43. Id. at 659; accord Exum v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 154 N.C. 408, 411, 70
S.E. 845, 846 (1911); Royster v. Southern Ry., 147 N.C. 347, 350-51, 61 S.E. 179,
180 (1908); Pharr v. Southern Ry., 133 N.C. 610, 615, 45 S.E. 1021, 1022-23
(1903); Pleasants v. Raleigh & Augusta Air-Line R.R., 95 N.C. 195, 201-02
(1886); Parker v. Wilmington & Weldon R.R., 86 N.C. 221, 225 (1882) ("the party
injured is taken to have brought the injury on himself"); see also Harrison v.
North Carolina R.R., 194 N.C. 656, 660, 140 S.E. 598, 601 (1927) ("the law is not
able to protect those who have eyes and will not see" (citations omitted)).
44. 132 N.C. 934 (1903).
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contributorily negligent plaintiff] may have received to be the
result of his own carelessness."4 5
The supreme court founded its embracement of the contributory negligence doctrine also on the court's assumption that no
method exists to allocate damages between the parties. The
Manly court explained that, in its view, no rule exists to determine how to apportion damages when both parties are at fault.4 6
In 1887, the court reiterated this view in Walker v. Reidsville,
stating that "[n]o rule can be devised to determine how much of
the damage is attributable to the one party and how much to the
47
other."
The supreme court based its adoption of the contributory negligence doctrine also upon the court's recognition that the overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions-all-followed the
doctrine. The Morrison court cited the contributory negligence
doctrine as a "general rule" after examining "with care some of the
leading American and English authorities." 4 This statement,
combined with the absence of stated rationale for the doctrine's
adoption and the then-wide acceptance of the doctrine in other
jurisdictions, indicates that the court did not base the doctrine on
any unique attributes of North Carolina or North Carolinians, but
simply followed the mainstream thought on the issue.
Later supreme court opinions rested the court's explanation of
the contributory negligence doctrine on "proximate cause."
Although earlier opinions intimated this rationale, 49 a 1911 opinion, Harvell v. Weldon Lumber Co.,5° summarized the thought:
"[Wihen the plaintiff and the defendant are negligent, and the
negligence of both concur and continue to the time of the injury,
45. Id. at 940 (citations omitted).
46. Manly, 74 N.C. at 659-60 ("For the parties being mutually in fault, there
can be no apportionment of damages, no rule existing to settle in such cases,
what one shall pay more than another.").
47. 96 N.C. 382, 384 (1887). The supreme court's analysis in Herring v.
Wilmington & Raleigh Railroad Co., 32 N.C. 402 (1849), also indicates that the
Morrison court was unaware of the comparative negligence doctrine or any
similar doctrine. For a description of Herring, see supra notes 14 - 20 and
accompanying text.
48. Morrison, 63 N.C. at 348. The Herring court, in setting forth its dictum
regarding the contributory negligence doctrine, likewise cited no authority for its
statement. See Herring, 32 N.C. at 408-09.
49. See, e.g., Chambers v. Western North Carolina R.R., 91 N.C. 471, 475
(1884); Farmer v. Washington & Weldon R.R., 88 N.C. 564, 570 (1883).
50. 154 N.C. 254, 70 S.E. 389 (1911).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss1/1
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the negligence of the defendant is not in the legal sense proximate." 5 1 Other opinions explained that a contributorily negligent
5 21
plaintiff's negligence is "the proximate cause" of his injuries.
Several commentators attribute the United States' quick
acceptance of the contributory negligence doctrine on courts'
alleged desire to aid the industrial revolution, particularly railroads. 53 Railroad cases shaped nineteenth-century negligence law
in North Carolina and the United States. 54 Many courts reasoned
as the North Carolina Supreme Court did in Forbes v. Atlantic &
North Carolina Railroad: "Railroads are lawful and useful and
while they must use care not to injure the citizen, the citizen must
use care also. And he cannot complain if harm come[s] to him by
his own negligence."5 5
51. Id. at 262, 70 S.E. at 392; see also Elder v. Plaza Ry., 194 N.C. 617, 619,
140 S.E. 298, 299 (1927) ("the real, efficient, and proximate cause"); Lea v.
Southern Pub. Util. Co., 176 N.C. 511, 514, 97 S.E. 492, 493 (1918) ("when the
plaintiff and defendant are negligent, and the negligence of both concur and
continue to the time of the injury, the negligence of the defendant is in a legal
sense not the proximate cause of the injury"); Exum v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,
154 N.C. 408, 413, 70 S.E. 845, 847 (1911). The court sometimes termed the
plaintiff's contributory negligence as the "efficient" proximate cause, apparently
to account for the difficulty with "the proximate cause" rationale. See, e.g., Elder,
194 N.C. at 619, 140 S.E. at 299..
52. See, e.g., Smith v. Norfolk & S. R.R., 145 N.C. 98, 103, 58 S.E. 799, 801
(1907) (citations omitted); Brewster v. Elizabeth City, 137 N.C. 392, 394, 49 S.E.
885, 886-87 (1905). These "the proximate cause" pronouncements conflict with
the Manly court's earlier statement that "the negligence of both [parties is] the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury." Manly, 74 N.C. at 659.
Nineteenth and early-twentieth century courts of other states also based
their rationale for the contributory negligence doctrine on "proximate cause."
See Prosser, supra note 2, at 468 (citations omitted). This characterization of
"proximate cause" reasons that the plaintiff's contributory negligence is an
intervening, and thus insulating, cause between the defendant's negligence and
the plaintiff's injury. See id. at 468 & n. 16 (citing Gilman v. Central Vermont
R.R., 107 A. 122 (Ver. 1919); Ware v. Saufley, 237 S.W. 1060 (Ky. Ct. App. 1922);
Exum v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 154 N.C. 408, 70 S.E. 845 (1911); Chesapeake
& Ohio R.R. v. Wills, 68 S.E. 395 (Va. 1910)).
The North Carolina Supreme Court later rejected this "the proximate cause"
rationale. See infra notes 391 - 392 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 2, at 468-69; Malone, supra note 11, at 16469.
54. See WOODS, supra note 13, § 1:5.
55. 76 N.C. 454, 457 (1876); see also Murphy v. Wilmington & Weldon R.R., 70
N.C. 437, 437-39 (1874) (castigating a plaintiff who parked his wagon too close to
the tracks and brought suit when a train destroyed it).
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These commentators explain that the contributory negligence
doctrine helped the courts to control sympathetic juries and thus
control corporate liability in furtherance of the industrial revolution. One commentator reasons that the doctrine demonstrates
the philosophy of the times which encouraged dangerous undertakings and permitted
human sacrifice for the sake of
56
industrialization.

Nearly all of the published nineteenth-century negligence
cases decided by the North Carolina Supreme Court that discuss
the contributory negligence doctrine involve a railroad. Indeed,
railroads succeeded in the great majority of nineteenth-century
negligence cases in which they were a defendant before the
supreme court. One North Carolina commentator reasoned that
"[c]onsidering the favorable political and judicial climate for railroads [in North Carolina], it is not surprising that the new legal
rules largely worked in the favor of railroad interests."5 7 In addition, the commentator observed that "[tihe language and reasoning of the railroad decisions also evinced the court's predisposition
to railroad interests."5 8

A close reading of the North Carolina Supreme Court's nineteenth-century opinions discussing the contributory negligence
doctrine, however, does not reveal any particular sort of pro-railroad bias. Moreover, the language and reasoning of the court's
nineteenth-century railroad decisions mirror the language and
reasoning of other states' high courts nineteenth-century railroad
decisions. Absent convincing concrete evidence, it seems that theorizing that a particular court adopted a particular legal doctrine
because of the court's unspoken desire to assist the industrial
revolution is pure speculation. Given the largely uniform application of the contributory negligence doctrine throughout the United
States-and the lack of dissents-, it is much more likely that the
railroads and other industrial entities were simply the benefactors
of the reasoned legal theories of the day.
In summary, the North Carolina Supreme Court based the
adoption of the contributory negligence doctrine on four rationales: (1) The injured party "brought the injury upon himself"; (2)
No rule existed to allow for the apportionment of damages; (3) All
56.

JOHN

G. FLEMING,

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS

5-6 (1968).

57. James L. Hunt, Note, Private Law and PublicPolicy: Negligence Law and
PoliticalChange in Nineteenth-CenturyNorth Carolina,66 N.C. L. REv. 421, 429

(1988).
58. Id.
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other American jurisdictions followed the doctrine; and (4) The
plaintiff's negligence was "the proximate cause" of the injury,
while the defendant's negligence was not "the proximate cause."
These rationales are examined further in part IV of this article.
C. Limitations on the Contributory Negligence Doctrine in
North Carolina
From the first appearance of the contributory negligence doctrine, courts "have displayed an uneasy consciousness that something is wrong."5 9 Although American courts quickly adopted the
doctrine without lengthy analysis, nearly all American courts and
legislatures immediately began limiting the general contributory
negligence rule with modifications that lessened the rule's impact
on plaintiffs. Both the North Carolina Supreme Court and the
North Carolina General Assembly joined in this effort. This section describes the several limitations placed on the contributory
negligence rule in North Carolina.
1.

Last Clear Chance

The most significant limitation on the contributory negligence
rule is the last clear chance doctrine. An 1842 English case,
Davies v. Mann,60 is cited as the first articulation of the doctrine.6 In Davies, the defendant negligently rode his horses and
wagon into a donkey which the plaintiff had left in the road. 62 The
court allowed the plaintiff to recover the donkey's value even
though the plaintiff was negligent. Lord Abinger held that
because "the defendant might by proper care, have avoided injuring the animal, and did not, he is liable for the consequences of his
63
negligence, though the animal may have been improperly there."
In an 1881 case, Gunter v. Wicker, 64 the North Carolina
Supreme Court adopted the last clear chance doctrine. In Gunter,
the defendants employed the plaintiff to run a saw mill. 65 When
the plaintiff entered the machinery to oil without adjusting the
engine to secure his safety, one of the defendants turned on the
59. Prosser, supra note 2, at 470.
60. 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842).
61. See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 2, at 471.

62. Davies, 152 Eng. Rep. at 588.
63. Id. at 589.
64. 85 N.C. 310 (1881).
65. Id. at 310.
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machinery without warning. 6 6 The plaintiff received injuries and
sought damages in court.6 7 The jury found for the plaintiff and
the defendants appealed.6
Citing Davies, the supreme court
stated that "'[n]otwithstanding the previous negligence of the
plaintiff, if at the time when the injury was committed, it might
have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence
69
on the part of the defendant an action will lie for damages.' "
The supreme court reasoned that, regardless of the plaintiff's
negligence, the defendant's "care and attention would have pre70
vented the accident, and to their absence it must be attributed."
Moreover, the court observed, "[the plaintiff's exposure of his person was not a cause, but a condition which rendered the injury
possible and actual, as the result of the absence of the caution
which was imposed upon the defendant in consequence."71
The supreme court's statement of the last clear chance doctrine has not materially varied from this original formulation. In
North Carolina,
in order to submit the issue of last clear chance to the jury, the
evidence must tend to show the following elements: (1) that plaintiff, by his own negligence, placed himself in a position of peril (or
a position of peril to which he was inadvertent); (2) that defendant
saw, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have seen, and
understood the perilous position of plaintiff; (3) that he should
have so seen or discovered plaintiff's perilous condition in time to
have avoided injuring him; (4) that notwithstanding such notice
defendant failed or refused to use every reasonable means at his
command to avoid the impending injury; and (5) that as a result of
such failure or refusal plaintiff was in fact injured.7 2
The North Carolina Supreme Court, like courts of other jurisdictions, found some analytic difficulty with the last clear chance
doctrine.7 3 In Baker v. Wilmington & Weldon Railroad, 4 the doc66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 312 (quoting Davies, 152 Eng. Rep. at 589).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 313.
72. Wray v. Hughes, 44 N.C. App. 678, 681-82, 262 S.E.2d 307, 309-10 (1980)
(citing Cockrell v. Cromartie Transp. Co., 295 N.C. 444, 245 S.E.2d 497 (1978);
Vernon v. Crist, 291 N.C. 646, 231 S.E.2d 591 (1977); Exum v. Boyles 272 N.C.
567, 158 S.E.2d 845 (1968); Bell v. Wallace, 32 N.C. App. 370, 232 S.E.2d 305,
disc. rev. denied, 292 N.C. 466, 233 S.E.2d 921 (1977)).
73. See generally Leon Green, ContributoryNegligence and Proximate Cause,
6 N.C. L. REV. 3, 21-30 (1927).
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trine is referred to as "intervening negligence."7 5 In Neal v. Carolina Central Railroad,76 the court equated the doctrine with the
issue of proximate cause.7 7 In 1928, the court, in Redmon v.
Southern Railway ,78 noted the contradiction in the court's previous rationale for the last clear chance doctrine, but found it unnecessary to resolve the issue.7 9 The supreme court later explained
that in North Carolina "last clear chance is 'but an application of
the doctrine of proximate cause.'"80
Some commentators explain that the last clear chance doctrine serves as a transition between the contributory negligence
and comparative negligence doctrines."' It is generally recognized, however, that the doctrine is simply the result of courts'
of the harshness of the contributory negligence
acknowledgment
82
doctrine.
2.

Willful and Wanton Defendant

Another early limitation on the contributory negligence doctrine provides that a plaintiff's contributory negligence will not
bar a plaintiff's recovery if the defendant's conduct was willful
and wanton.5 3 The North Carolina Supreme Court noted this lim74. 118 N.C. 1015, 24 S.E. 415 (1895).
75. Id. at 1021, 24 S.E. at 417; see also Pickett v. Wilmington & Weldon R.R.,
117 N.C. 616, 631, 23 S.E. 264, 266-67 (1895).
76. 126 N.C. 634, 36 S.E. 117 (1900).
77. Id. at 639, 36 S.E. at 118 ("The doctrine of proximate cause-the last clear
chance-is firmly established."); see also Norman v. Charlotte Elec. Ry., 167 N.C.
533, 544-45, 83 S.E. 835, 838 (1914); Edge v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 153 N.C.
212, 214-18, 69 S.E. 74, 75-76 (1910).
78. 195 N.C. 764, 143 S.E. 829 (1928).
79. Id. at 769, 143 S.E. at 831-32. The Redmon opinion contains a summary
of principles associated with the last clear chance doctrine at the time. Id. at
769-71, 143 S.E. at 832.
80. Vernon v. Crist, 291 N.C. 646, 654, 231 S.E.2d 591, 596 (1977) (quoting
Exum v. Boyles, 272 N.C. 567, 578, 158 S.E.2d 845, 854 (1968)).
81. See, e.g., Fleming James, Jr., Last ClearChance: A TransitionalDoctrine,
47 YALE L.J. 704 (1938).
82. See Prosser, supra note 2, at 472.
83. See generally DAYE & MORRIS, supra note 5, § 19.21.32. Professors Daye
and Morris note that
[t]he terms "wanton" and "reckless" appear to be used synonymously in
this context. Willful and wanton conduct "rests on the assumption that
[the defendant] knew the probable consequences [of his act or failure to
act], but was recklessly, wantonly or intentionally indifferent to the
results." It describes conduct in which the defendant proceeds in
reckless or conscious disregard of a high risk to the safety of others.
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4
itation in dictum in Herringv. Wilmington & Raleigh Railroad."
5
In an 1899 case, Brendle v. Spencer, the supreme court stated
that "[i]t is well settled that contributory negligence, even if
admitted by the plaintiff, is no defense to willful or wanton
7
injury.""6 This limitation is applied in the same manner today.
Later courts held that if the plaintiff's conduct is also willful and
wanton, the plaintiff's contributory negligence will bar the plaintiff from recovery. 8

3.

Burden of Proof

The North Carolina Supreme Court's early statement of the
contributory negligence doctrine in Morrison indicated that the
plaintiff's burden did not end at proving the defendant's negligence. In dictum, the Morrison court stated that it is the plaintiff's burden to show the absence of the plaintiff's negligence."9 In
an 1883 divided decision, Owens v. Richmond & Danville Railroad,90 the supreme court, in a rather contradictory opinion,
seemed to rule that the plaintiff's burden does, in fact, include
this showing.
In Owens, the trial court charged the jury that it is the
defendant's burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. 9 1 The majority
noted that the courts of England and other states were split on the
question of whether the plaintiff has the burden of proving his
exercise of ordinary care or whether the defendant has the burden
Id. § 19.21.32, at 278 (footnotes omitted).
84. 32 N.C. 402, 409 (1849) ("when there was negligence on both sides,"
"neither party can recover, unless one be guilty of wanton injury or gross
neglect"). For a description of Herring, see supra notes 14 - 20 and
accompanying text.
85. 125 N.C. 474, 34 S.E. 634 (1899).
86. Id. at 478, 34 S.E. at 635. Although the Brendle court stated that this
limitation is "well settled," Brendle appears to be the first North Carolina
Supreme Court case in which the limitation is applied.
87. See, e.g., Pearce v. Barham, 271 N.C. 285, 289-90, 156 S.E.2d 290, 294
(1967); Fry v. Southern Pub. Util. Co., 183 N.C. 281, 293, 111 S.E. 354, 361
(1922).
88. See, e.g., Harrington v. Collins, 298 N.C. 535, 538, 259 S.E.2d 275, 278
(1979) (citing Pearce v. Barham, 271 N.C. 285, 156 S.E.2d 290 (1967)).
89. See Morrison v. Cornelius, 63 N.C. 346, 348-49 (1869) ("the party injured,
before he can recover damages at law, must show that he has exercised proper
care, and is free from blame").
90. 88 N.C. 502 (1883).
91. Id. at 504.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss1/1

16

1996]

Gardner: Contributory Negligence, Comparative Negligence, and Stare Decisi
CONTRIBUTORY AND COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE

of proving the plaintiff's lack thereof.9 2 The majority stated that
"we do not undertake to reconcile the divergent decisions in reference to the burden of proof."9 3 The majority found it "clear," however, that if the plaintiff's evidence does not reveal "whether the
plaintiff exhibited the necessary watchfulness and care to avoid
the consequent harm or injury, it will be assumed there was not
such want of it on his part."9 4 The majority reasoned that if the
plaintiff's contributory negligence could be inferred from the
plaintiff's evidence or the defendant's evidence, the "duty" of
showing the plaintiff's contributory negligence "in self-exculpation devolves upon the defendant." 9 5 The majority further
explained that "it must be left to the jury to determine whether,
upon the facts proved, the plaintiff has a legal cause of action
against the defendant," especially considering that other doctrines
may effect the outcome.9 6
The majority held, however, that it was error for the trial
judge to have instructed the jury regarding the defendant's burden. 9 7 The majority explained that it is improper to "burden the
defence" by requiring the defendant to demonstrate the plaintiff's
negligence. 98 The majority stated that "[tihe inquiry should have
been free from that embarrassment." 99 The majority described
this ruling as "just and fair."10 0 Thus, the majority ruled that
nothing should be said about this "embarrassment" to the jury.
92. Id. at 504-05. The Owens majority surveyed these decisions. Id. at 505-

07.
93. Id. at 507.
94. Id.
95. Id. ("[]f the plaintiff in any legal sense were the cause or the concurring
cause of his own injury, the duty of so showing in self-exculpation devolves upon
the defendant. The inference of this co-operating agency may be drawn from the
plaintiff's proof of the defendant's neglect or misconduct, as well as by
substantive and independent testimony produced by the defendant."). The
Owens court quoted Cleveland & PittsburghRail Road v. Rowan, 66 Penn. 393
(1870): "It is true, if negligence appear by the plaintiff's own testimony, the
defendant might rest on it as securely as if proved by himself. As the love of life
and the instinct of preservation are the highest motive for care in any reasoning
being, they will stand for proof until the contrary appears." Id. at 399, quoted in
Owens, 88 N.C. at 507.
96. Owens, 88 N.C. at 507-08. The Owens court cited last clear chance as an
example. Id. at 508.
97. Id. at 512.

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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Justice Thomas Ruffin, dissenting, stated that the rule pronounced by the majority "strikes me, not only as being illogical
and contrary to the rules of good pleading, in that, it requires the
plaintiff to aver and prove negative matters, but as losing sight of
that reasonable presumption, which the common law always
makes, that every person does his duty until the contrary is
shown." 10 1 Justice Ruffin further reasoned that the majority's
rule is "in opposition to the very law of our nature, and makes no
allowance for that instinct which prompts men, when in hazardous situations, to use care in avoiding injury and preserving their
lives."'0 2
Four years after Owens, the General Assembly statutorily
placed the burden of pleading and proving contributory negligence
on the defendant. 10 3 Contributory negligence remains an affirmative defense with such pleading and proof burdens today in North
Carolina.104
4. ContributoryNegligence as a Matter of Law
An important "de facto" limitation on the contributory negligence doctrine is the North Carolina courts' appropriate reluctance to take the contributory negligence issue from the jury.'
A
North Carolina court's finding that the plaintiff is contributorily
negligent as a matter of law is now infrequent. This is, however,
only a relatively recent development.
Early cases display the North Carolina Supreme Court's willingness to approve the taking of the contributory negligence issue
from the jury. In Walker v. Town of Reidsville, °6 one of the few
101. Id. at 517 (Ruffin, J., dissenting).
102. Id.
103. See Act of Jan. 26, 1887, ch. 33, § 1, 1887 N.C. Sess. Laws 81, 81; see also
Cox v. Norfolk & C.R. Co., 123 N.C. 604, 613, 31 S.E. 848, 850 (1898) (applying
the statute); Jordan v. City of Asheville, 112 N.C. 743, 745, 16 S.E. 760, 760-61
(1893) (same).
104. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-139 (1983); see also Woodson v. Rowland, 329
N.C. 330, 338, 407 S.E.2d 222, 227 (1991); Clary v. Alexander County Bd. of

Educ., 286 N.C. 525, 532, 212 S.E.2d 160, 165 (1975).
105. See generally DAYE & MoRRis, supra note 5, § 19.21.34.
106. 96 N.C. 382, 2 S.E. 74 (1887). Chambers v. Western North Carolina
Railroad, 91 N.C. 471, 474 (1884), appears to be the first reported negligence

case where the contributory negligence issue was taken from the jury. See also
Lambeth v. North Carolina R.R., 66 N.C. 494, 498 (1872) (trial judge instructed
the jury "that any alightment from the cars when moving was contributory

negligence, and in law disabled the plaintiff to recover," but the supreme court
found this instruction erroneous).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss1/1
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early non-railroad negligence cases, the defendant had dug a large
pit in a busy street. 10 7 The defendant placed barriers in some
places around the pit, but did not place one on the side facing a
walkway between a market-house and the town hall. 08 The
plaintiff approached from the unbarricaded side, fell into the pit
and sustained bodily injury. 0 9 The plaintiff brought suit asserting that the defendant negligently failed to properly barricade the
pit. 110 The evidence showed that the plaintiff had seen men working in the pit for ten days prior, but was thinking about a trip he
was to make when he fell."' At trial, the judge intimated his
opinion that the plaintiff could not recover and entered a nonsuit." 2 Affirming, the supreme court reasoned that "there can be
no reasonable question that the plaintiff negligently contributed"
to his injury."i 3 The court explained: "A reasonably prudent and
careful man would not forget the presence of such danger in his
immediate neighborhood."'" 4 The court did not comment on the
jury's role in this regard.
In Exum v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad,"5 the defendant's
train hit and killed the plaintiff's intestate while he walked on the
defendant's tracks."16 The plaintiff offered evidence of the defendant's engineer's negligence at trial."i 7 The trial judge, however,
8
granted the defendant's motion for nonsuit."
On appeal, the supreme court quoted Neal v. CarolinaCentral
Railroad:"9
If plaintiff's intestate was walking up defendant's road, in open
day-light, on a straight piece of road, where he could have seen
defendant's train 150 yards, and was run over and injured, [the
intestate] was guilty of negligence; and although the defendant
may have been guilty of negligence in running its train at a
greater rate of speed than was allowed by the town ordinance, or
107. Walker, 96 N.C. at 383, 2 S.E. at 74.
108. Id. at 383-84, 2 S.E. at 74-75.

109. Id.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 383, 2 S.E. at 74.
Id. at 383-84, 2 S.E. at 75.
Id. at 383, 2 S.E. at 74.
Id. at 385, 2 S.E. at 75.
Id.
154 N.C. 408, 70 S.E. 845 (1911).
Id. at 409-411, 70 S.E. at 845.
Id. at 409-411, 412, 70 S.E. at 845-46.
Id. at 409, 70 S.E. at 845.
126 N.C. 634, 36 S.E. 117 (1900).
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in not ringing its bell as required by said ordinance, and in not
keeping a lookout by its engineer, as it ought to have done, yet the
injury would have been attributed to the negligence of plaintiff's
0
intestate. 12
The Exum court reasoned that, based on the rules announced in
Neal and similar cases, the plaintiff was contributorily negligent
as a matter of law and affirmed the trial court.' 2 1 Exum is particularly notable because of Chief Justice Walter Clark's vigorous
dissent. Chief Justice Clark characterized the majority's opinion
as holding "that the defendant, as a matter of law, had a right to
kill the deceased and that by a nonsuit a jury can be deprived of
any right to determine whose negligence was the proximate cause
of the death."1 22 Chief Justice Clark pointedly explained that
"[t]he bare fact that the intestate was walking on the track did
not, as a matter of law, give the defendant the right to kill him."'23
24
He concluded that the issue "should have been left to the jury."
Despite Chief Justice Clark's forceful dissent in Exum, the
North Carolina Supreme Court continued to exhibit its willingness to find a plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law
and thus take the issue from the jury. Moreover, this willingness
increased during the 1940s and early-1950s. The supreme court
began to find contributory negligence as a matter of law in a
greater number of fact situations. 2 5 Cases were differentiated:
120. Id. at 638, 36 S.E. at 118, quoted in Exum, 154 N.C. at 411, 70 S.E. at 846.
121. Exum, 154 N.C. at 412-13, 70 S.E. at 845-47.
122. Id. at 421, 70 S.E. at 850 (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 414, 70 S.E. at 847 (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
124. Id. (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
125. See, e.g., Garmon v. Thomas, 241 N.C. 412, 85 S.E.2d 589 (1955); Badders
v. Lassiter, 240 N.C. 413, 82 S.E.2d 357 (1954); Sheldon v. Childers, 240 N.C.
449, 82 S.E.2d 396 (1954); Singletary v. Nixon, 239 N.C. 634, 80 S.E.2d 676
(1954); Lyerly v. Griffin, 237 N.C. 686, 75 S.E.2d 730 (1953); Morrisette v. A.G.
Boone Co., 235 N.C. 162, 69 S.E.2d 239 (1952); Morris v. Jenrette Transp. Co:,
235 N.C. 568, 70 S.E.2d 845 (1952); Herndon v. North Carolina R.R., 234 N.C. 9,
65 S.E.2d 320 (1951); Moore v. Boone, 231 N.C. 494, 575 S.E.2d 783 (1950); Cox
v. Lee, 230 N.C. 155, 52 S.E.2d 355 (1949); Tyson v. Ford, 228 N.C. 778, 47
S.E.2d 251 (1948); Atkins v. White Transp. Co., 224 N.C. 688, 32 S.E.2d 209
(1944); Austin v. Overton, 222 N.C. 89, 21 S.E.2d 887 (1942); Montgomery v.
Blades, 222 N.C. 463, 23 S.E.2d 844 (1943); Godwin v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,
220 N.C. 281, 17 S.E.2d 137 (1941); Hampton v. Hawkins, 219 N.C. 205, 13
S.E.2d 227 (1941); Beck v. Hooks, 218 N.C. 105, 10 S.E.2d 608 (1940); Mason v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 208 N.C. 842, 181 S.E. 625 (1935) (without describing
the facts); Tart v. Southern Ry., 202 N.C. 52, 161 S.E. 720 (1932); Harrison v.
North Carolina R.R., 194 N.C. 656, 140 S.E. 598 (1927); Wright v. Southern Ry.,
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss1/1
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based on small details. 126 One North Carolina commentator
observed that "the phrase 'contributory negligence as a matter of
law' is readily applied to justify opposite results in cases with similar facts."127
This willingness was also displayed in the negligence per se
cases. 128 In 1907, the supreme court held that the violation of a
safety statute is negligence or contributory negligence per se.129
In response to this rule and common-law rules declaring actions
negligent per se, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted
many statutes declaring that certain actions prohibited by statute
are not to be considered negligence per se or contributory negligence as a matter of law. These include statutes declaring that a
party's failure to wear a seat belt may not be introduced in an
action for damages, 3 0 a party's failure to have an rearview mirror
on the parties' motorcycle shall not be considered contributory
negligence per se,131 a party's failure to wear a helmet while riding a motorcycle shall not be considered contributory negligence
per se, 132 and many other similar statutes. 133
155 N.C. 325, 71 S.E. 306 (1911). Several of these cases found contributory
negligence as a matter of law over forceful dissents.
126. Compare, e.g., Garmon v. Thomas, 241 N.C. 412, 85 S.E.2d 589 (1955)
with Goodson v.Williams, 237 N.C. 291, 74 S.E.2d 762 (1953), and Tyson, 228
N.C. at 778, 47 S.E.2d at 251 with Williams v. Express Lines, 198 N.C. 193, 151
S.E. 197 (1930). See Gerald C. Parker, Note, Torts-ContributoryNegligence as
a Matter of Law-A Threat to Stare Decisis, 34 N.C. L. REv. 137, 138 & n.5
(1955).
127. See Parker, supra note 126, at 138; see also David M. Clinard, Note,
Torts-Last Clear Chance-ContributoryNegligence as a Matter ofLaw, 33 N.C.
L. REV. 138, 142 (1954) ("contributory negligence as a matter of law ...explains
nothing and succeeds only in creating an aura of mystery about the entire
decision").
128. "Negligence per se" is often used in describing the violation of a safety
statute. Negligence per se is used here to also describe fact situations in which
the court will automatically find negligence, or contributory negligence, as a
matter of law.
129. See Leathers v. Blackwell Durham Tobacco Co., 144 N.C. 330, 344-52, 57
S.E. 11, 16-17 (1907); see also Watson Seafood & Poultry Co. v. George W.
Thomas, Inc., 289 N.C. 7, 11-12, 220 S.E.2d 536, 539-40 (1975); Stone v. Texas
Co., 180 N.C. 546, 551-54, 105 S.E. 425, 427-30 (1920).
130. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-135.2A (1989).
131. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-126(c) (1989).
132. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-140.4(b) (1989).
133. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-137.1, 20-141, 20-158, 20-158.1, 20-175.3, 25-3406, 62-242, 90-95.5, 113-291.8, 143-291, 143-299.1 (1989).
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A particularly contentious example of this phenomenon is the
outrunning-headlights cases. In a 1927 case, Weston v. Southern
Railway,3 the supreme court ruled that a plaintiff motorist is
negligent as a matter of law when the motorist travels at speeds
at which the motorist cannot stop within the length of the motorist's headlight radius. 13 5 The physics of a strict following of this
rule resulted in a quite harsh situation: a person hitting something with their car at night was negligent as a matter of law in
nearly all circumstances. The supreme court followed this rule
through the early-1950s. 136 In 1953, the General Assembly overruled this rule by statute. 137
Beginning in the mid-1950s-and continuing through
today-the supreme court backed away from its previously
aggressive and expansive view of contributory negligence as a
matter of law. For example, in direct contrast to Walker v. Town
of Reidsville, 38 the supreme court held in the 1955 case of Dennis
v. City of Albermarle139 that a plaintiff is not contributorily negligent as a matter of law just because the plaintiff temporarily forgot or was inattentive to a known danger.- 40 A 1968 case, Miller
v. Miller,'14 1 demonstrated how far the supreme court had come in
this regard. In Miller, the supreme court held that the failure to
use an available seatbelt does not constitute contributory negligence per se.142
134. 194 N.C. 210, 139 S.E. 237 (1927).
135. Id. at 213-16, 139 S.E. at 238-39.
136. Chaffin v. Brame, 233 N.C. 377, 381-82, 64 S.E.2d 276, 279 (1951); Cox v.
Lee, 230 N.C. 155, 158, 52 S.E.2d 355, 356-57 (1949); Tyson v. Ford, 228 N.C.
778, 780, 47 S.E.2d 251, 253 (1948); see also Lemuel Gibbons, Note, NegligenceContributoryNegligence-OutrunningHeadlightsas, 27 N.C. L. REv. 153 (1948).
137. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-141(n) (1989). Section 20-141(n) provides that "the
failure of a motorist to stop his vehicle within the radius of its headlights or the
range of his vision shall not be held negligence per se or contributory negligence
per se." Id.; see Speed Restrictions, 31 N.C. L. REv. 415 (1953).
138. 96 N.C. 382, 2 S.E. 74 (1887). For a description of Walker, see supra notes
106 - 114 and accompanying text.
139. 242 N.C. 263, 87 S.E.2d 561 (1955).
140. Id. at 268-69, 87 S.E.2d at 565-66 (citing CoRPus Junis SECUNDUM and
cases from other states, but not citing Walker).
141. 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968).
142. Id. at 237, 160 S.E.2d at 72-74. The North Carolina General Assembly
later provided that a parties' failure to wear a seat belt may not be introduced in
a suit for damages in a safety statute requiring the use of seat belts. See N.C.
GEN. STAT.

§ 20-135.2A (1989).
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In a 1987 case, Taylor v. Walker,143 the supreme court summarized its modern view:
Only in exceptional cases is it proper to enter a directed verdict or
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict against a plaintiff in a
negligence case. Issues arising in negligence cases are ordinarily
not susceptible of summary adjudication because application of
the prudent man test, or any other applicable standard of care, is
generally for the jury. Greater judicial caution is therefore called
for in actions alleging negligence as a basis for plaintiff's recovery
or, in the alternative, asserting contributory negligence as a bar to
that recovery. 144
5. Plaintiff's Status
Both the North Carolina Supreme Court and the North Carolina General Assembly limited the contributory negligence doctrine by making the doctrine inapplicable to particular plaintiffs.
In 1908, the United States Congress enacted a statute adopting
the pure comparative negligence doctrine 145 for negligence suits
brought against interstate railroads for injuries sustained by their
employees.141 In 1913, the General Assembly, like many state legislatures, followed Congress's lead by adopting a statute rejecting
the contributory negligence doctrine and adopting the compara143. 320 N.C. 729, 360 S.E.2d 796 (1987).
144. Id. at 734, 360 S.E.2d at 799 (citing King v. Allred, 309 N.C. 113, 305
S.E.2d 554 (1983); Williams v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 296 N.C. 400, 250
S.E.2d 255 (1979); Moore v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 296 N.C. 467, 251 S.E.2d 419
(1979); Millikan v. Guilford Mills, Inc., 70 N.C. App. 705, 320 S.E.2d 909 (1984),
disc. rev. denied, 312 N.C. 798, 325 S.E.2d 631 (1985); Gladstein v. South Square
Assoc., 39 N.C. App. 171, 249 S.E.2d 827 (1978), disc. rev. denied, 296 N.C. 636,
254 S.E.2d 178 (1979)); see also Lamm v. Bissette Realty, Inc., 327 N.C. 412, 418,
395 S.E.2d 112, 116 (1990); Daughtry v. Turnage, 295 N.C. 543, 547, 246 S.E.2d
788, 789-91 (1978); Clark v. Bodycombe, 289 N.C. 246, 251, 221 S.E.2d 506, 510
(1976).
Several earlier supreme court opinions make similar statements regarding
contributory negligence per se. See, e.g., Phillips v. Nessmith, 226 N.C. 173, 174,
37 S.E.2d 178, 179 (1946); Mulford v. Cotton States Hotel Co., 213 N.C. 603, 604,
197 S.E. 169, 170 (1938); Battle v. Cleaver, 179 N.C. 112, 114, 101 S.E. 555, 556
(1919). A study of the negligence cases from the mid-twentieth century reveals,
however, that the statement gave way in application. See notes 105 - 137 and
accompanying text.
145. For a description of the different types of comparative negligence, see
infra part III.A.
146. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988); see generally WOODS, supra note 13, § 1:11.
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for suits against intrastate railroads by
tive negligence doctrine
147
their employees.
The supreme court limited the use of the contributory negligence doctrine when children's actions are at issue. The court
held that children under the age of seven are, as a matter of law,
incapable of contributory negligence. 148 Children between the
ages of seven and fourteen are rebuttably presumed incapable of
contributory negligence. 149 Children over the age of fourteen are
presumed capable of contributory negligence. 150 This capability
may be rebutted, however, by proving that the child lacked the
and experience of an ordinary child of the
discretion, 5knowledge,
1
same age.'
Another limitation stated by the supreme court, albeit rarely
used, is known as the "rescue doctrine."' 5 2 The rescue doctrine
provides that a contributorily-negligent plaintiff who risks his or
her life or serious injury in attempting a rescue is not barred from
147. Laws 1913, c.6, § 2, codified at N.C.
242(c) provides:
In all actions .

.

GEN. STAT.

§ 62-242(c) (1989). Section

. brought against any common carrier by railroad to

recover damages for personal injury to an employee.... the fact that the
employee may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar
a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-242(c) (1989); see generally Turk, supra note 2, at 334.
148. See Hoots v. Beeson, 272 N.C. 644, 647, 159 S.E.2d 16, 19 (1968); Walston
v. Greene, 247 N.C. 693, 695, 102 S.E.2d 124, 125 (1958).
149. See Weeks v. Barnard, 265 N.C. 339, 340, 143 S.E.2d 809, 810 (1965);
Adams v. State Bd. of Educ., 248 N.C. 506, 511, 103 S.E.2d 854, 857 (1958);
Caudle v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 202 N.C. 404, 407, 163 S.E. 122, 124 (1932).
150. Welch v. Jenkins, 271 N.C. 138, 142, 155 S.E.2d 763, 766-67 (1967)
(citations omitted); Baker v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 150 N.C. 562, 564-68, 64 S.E.
506, 507-08 (1909). The supreme court has long held that a child's age and
maturity are factors in determining the standard of care required of the child.
See Manly v. Wilmington & Weldon R.R., 74 N.C. 655, 660 (1876) ("The caution
required is according to the maturity and capacity of the child." (citation
omitted)); see also Weeks v. Barnard, 265 N.C. 339, 340, 143 S.E.2d 809, 810
(1965); Adams, 248 N.C. at 511, 103 S.E.2d at 857. Both subjective and objective
considerations are involved in determining such standard of care. See generally
DAYS & MORRIS, supra note 5, § 16.40.5.
151. See Welch, 271 N.C. at 142, 155 S.E.2d at 766 (citing Adams, 248 N.C. at
512, 103 S.E.2d at 858); Caudle, 202 N.C. at 407, 163 S.E. at 124 (citations
omitted)).
152. See Caldwell v. Deese, 288 N.C. 375, 380, 218 S.E.2d 379, 382 (1975);
Partin v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 40 N.C. App. 630, 634, 253 S.E.2d 605,
609-10, disc. rev. denied, 297 N.C. 611, 257 S.E.2d 219 (1979).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss1/1
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recovery against a negligent defendant.15 3 This doctrine does not
apply if the attempt is recklessly or rashly made, or if the plaintiff
54
caused the peril.'
Thus it is evident that the strict idea of the contributory negligence doctrine barring all contributorily negligent plaintiffs from
recovery has considerably eroded in North Carolina over the
years. It is also important to note that the development of the
rules associated with the contributory negligence doctrine was a
combined effort between the North Carolina Supreme Court and
the North Carolina General Assembly.
II.

CRITICISM OF THE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE DOCTRINE

The contributory negligence doctrine is widely and thoroughly
criticized. It is difficult-impossible may be the appropriate
term-to find a defender of the contributory negligence doctrine in
modern case law or legal scholarship. This part discusses some of
the criticism.
A. An Unjust Doctrine
The primary criticism of the contributory negligence doctrine
is nearly universal: The contributory negligence doctrine is inherently unfair. The doctrine makes one party bear the entire loss
even though the loss is caused by the fault of two or more parties. 1 55 Normally, the one party bearing the entire loss is the
"injured plaintiff, least able to bear it, and quite possibly much
less at fault than the defendant who goes scot free."' 5 6 Renowned
tort commentator William L. Prosser has noted: "No one ever has
succeeded in justifying that as a policy, and no one ever will." 15 7
Courts abandoning contributory negligence for comparative
negligence unanimously echo this criticism.158 Their descriptions
153. Alford v. Washington, 238 N.C. 694, 701, 78 S.E.2d 915, 920 (1953).
154. See Caldwell, 288 N.C. at 380, 218 S.E.2d at 382; Alford, 238 N.C. at 701,

78 S.E.2d at 920.
155. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 67, at 468-69; Prosser, supra note 2, at
468-69.
156. Prosser, supra note 2, at 469.
157. Id.
158. See McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 56 (Tenn. 1992); Nelson v.
Concrete Supply Co., 399 S.E.2d 783, 784 (S.C. 1991) (referring "bench and bar"
to Langley v. Boyter, 325 S.E.2d 550 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984)); Hilen v. Hays, 673
S.W.2d 713, 718 (Ky. 1984); Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo. 1983);
Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742, 753 (Iowa 1982); Alvis v. Ribar, 421
N.E.2d 886, 896 (Ill. 1981); Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234, 1237 (N.M. 1981);
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of contributory negligence include: "unfair";' 5 9 "inherent injustice";' s0 "substantial injustice since it was first invoked";16 1 "obvious injustice"; 162 "inequitable in its operation";' 6 3 and "the rule...
is a harsh one."' 6 4
Among the courts recently abandoning the contributory negligence doctrine for the comparative negligence doctrine are the
supreme courts of two of North Carolina's neighboring states,
South Carolina and Tennessee. In an unanimous opinion, the
South Carolina Supreme Court rejected the contributory negligence doctrine for the comparative negligence doctrine in 1991.165
The South Carolina Supreme Court referred "bench and bar" to an
opinion written by the chief judge of the South Carolina Court of
Appeals in Langley v. Boyter.116
The Langley court explained:
The continued existence of the doctrine of contributory negligence
• . . cannot be justified on any logical basis. It is contrary to the
basic premise of our fault system to allow a defendant, who is at
fault in causing an accident, to escape bearing any of its cost,
than equally at fault or
while requiring a plaintiff, who is no more 67
even less at fault, to bear all of its costs.'
The Langley court further explained that "the doctrine of contributory negligence is an idea whose time is gone."16s
Similarly, in an unanimous opinion, the Tennessee Supreme
Court rejected the contributory negligence doctrine for the comparative negligence doctrine in 1992.169 The Tennessee Supreme
Court concluded that
it is time to abandon the outmoded and unjust common law doctrine of contributory negligence and adopt in its place a system of
Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 883 (W. Va. 1979); Placek v.
City of Sterling Heights, 275 N.W.2d 511, 514 (Mich. 1979); Kaatz v. State, 540
P.2d 1037, 1048 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Cal.
1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 437 (Fla. 1973).
159. Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742, 753 (Iowa 1982).
160. Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1048 (Alaska 1975).
161. Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 275 N.W.2d 511, 514 (Mich. 1979).
162. Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 883 (W. Va. 1979).
163. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Cal. 1975).
164. Hoffman, 280 So. 2d at 437.

165. Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 399 S.E.2d 783 (S.C. 1991).
166. 325 S.E.2d 550 (S.C. App. 1984).

167. Id. at 562.
168. Id.
169. McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss1/1
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comparative fault. Justice simply will not permit our continued

adherence to a rule that, in the face of a judicial determination
that others bear responsibility, nevertheless completely
denies
170
injured litigants recompense for their damages.
The supreme courts of Alaska, California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa,
Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, and West Virginia
expressed similar sentiments in adopting the comparative negligence doctrine in place of the contributory negligence doctrine. 1 71
In an admiralty case, the United States Supreme Court
expressed its dim view of the contributory negligence doctrine:
The harsh rule of the common law under which contributory negligence wholly barred an injured person from recovery is completely
incompatible with modem admiralty policy and practice. Exercising its traditional discretion, admiralty had eveloped and now follows its own fairer and more flexible rule which allows such
consideration of contributory negligence in mitigation of damages
as justice requires. 172

In addition, the Supreme Court described contributory negligence
as a "discredited doctrine.
Prominent legal commentators agree that contributory negligence is harsh and unjust. Commentators such as William L.
Prosser, 74 John G. Fleming, 1 75 Leon Green, 7 6 Fowler V. Harper
and Fleming James, Jr., 7 7 Robert E. Keeton, 7 8 and Roscoe
Pound 79 all conclude that the contributory negligence doctrine is
unfair and inequitable. These commentators describe the contributory negligence doctrine as "the cruelest and most indefensible
170. Id. at 56.

171. See Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Ky. 1984); Gustafson v. Benda,
661 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo. 1983); Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 896 (Ill. 1981);
Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234, 1237 (N.M. 1981); and cases cited supra note 158.
172. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 408-09 (1953) (footnote
omitted).
173. Id. at 409.
174. Prosser, supra note 2.

175.
1985).

JOHN

G.

FLEMING, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS

134-36 (2d ed.

176. Leon Green, The Individual's Protection Under Negligence Law: Risk
Sharing, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 751 (1953).

177. 2

FOWLER

V.

HARPER

& FLEMING

JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF

TORTS

1193-

1209 (1956).
178. Robert E. Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L.
REV. 463 (1962).
179. Roscoe Pound, Comparative Negligence, 13 NACCA L.J. 195 (1954).
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injustice";''

"out of keeping with the prevailing and easily dis-

cernible sense of justice of laymen as well as lawyers";

s3

"funda-

mentally and radically unjust and ought to be given up";1'8 a
"harsh r6gime";185 and a "Draconian rule sired by a medieval con8 6
cept of cause out of a heartless laissez-faire."
The law faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill was among the first to criticize the contributory negligence
doctrine in a scholarly journal. In 1932, the law faculty authored
a law review article urging the North Carolina General Assembly
to pass a statute adopting the comparative negligence doctrine. 18 7
The law faculty explained that the "harsh result" of contributory
negligence "has been unpopular, as out of line with modern ideas
of justice."'
The law faculty noted that North Carolina courts
have adopted several limitations on the contributory negligence

doctrine "to alleviate the situation" and "to afford relief against
the strict application of the" doctrine.'8 9
The law faculty clearly articulated their position on the merits of the comparative negligence doctrine over the contributory
negligence doctrine:
It cannot be doubted that comparative negligence more closely
approximates ideal justice than does the harsh common law rule
of contributory negligence. The latter, if it was originally intended
as a deterrent, has long outlived its usefulness, since it allows a
complete defense to one who in most cases is mainly responsible
for the injury. Conceding the possibility of the contrary, the
defendant in any event should be answerable for his portion of the
fault. There seem to be no reasonable grounds for allowing the
plaintiff's conduct to exonerate completely a concededly negligent
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Green, supra note 176, at 757.
Prosser, supra note 2, at 469.
Keeton, supra note 178, at 506.
Id. at 507.
Pound, supra note 179, at 197.

185. FLEMING, supra note 175, at 135.
HARPER & JAMES, supra note 177, at 1207 (footnote omitted).
187. Proposals for Legislation in North Carolina, 11 N.C. L. REV. 51, 52-59

186. 2

(1932) [hereinafter Proposals]. For a description of the life of a comparative
negligence bill introduced in the North Carolina General Assembly in 1933, see
infra notes 256-257 and accompanying text.
188. Proposals, supra note 187, at 53.

189. Id. at 53-54. For a discussion of these limitations, see supra part I.C.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss1/1
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defendant. Comparative negligence apportions the fault
equitably. 190
The law faculty rejected the contention that a comparative
negligence system would be difficult to administer. 9 1 They noted
that other states found no difficulty and that North Carolina
courts had applied the comparative negligence doctrine under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act for, at that time, nearly twenty
years.1 92 The law faculty concluded that "there is a real need in
North Carolina for a general application of comparative
negligence."' 9 3
Two 1994 North Carolina Court of Appeals opinions reflect
the growing discomfort with the contributory negligence doctrine
in North Carolina. In Bosley v. Alexander, 19 4 the court of appeals
stated that "there are serious questions regarding the validity of
the doctrine of contributory negligence."' 9 5 The Bosley court
quoted the United States Supreme Court's description of contributory negligence: "a 'discredited doctrine.' ",196 The Bosley court
noted also that either the North Carolina Supreme Court or General Assembly could replace the contributory negligence system
1 97
with a comparative negligence system.
In Bowden v. Bell, 9 ' the court of appeals stated that contributory negligence "ha[s] been sharply criticized." 199 The Bowden
court noted that the North Carolina Legislative Research Commission recommended the abolishment of contributory negligence
for comparative negligence in 1981.2 ° ° Like the Bosley court, the
Bowden court voiced the supreme court's and General Assembly's
ability to alter the common-law in this area.2 0 '
Courts and legal scholars are not the only sources of contributory-negligence-doctrine criticism. Many of North Carolina's
newspapers are severely critical of the contributory negligence
doctrine as well. The Raleigh News & Observer calls the doctrine
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Proposals,supra note 187, at 57 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 57-58.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 59.
114 N.C. App. 470, 442 S.E.2d 82 (1994).
Id. at 471, 442 S.E.2d at 83 (citations omitted).
Id. (quoting Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409 (1953)).
Id.
116 N.C. App. 64, 446 S.E.2d 816 (1994).
Id. at 66, 446 S.E.2d at 818-19.
Id. at 66-67, 446 S.E.2d at 819 (citation omitted).
Id. at 67, 446 S.E.2d at 819 (citations omitted).
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"unfair," "antiquated," and "harsh."20 2 The Winston-Salem Journal describes the contributory negligence as "simply unfair" and
explains that justice requires the rejection of contributory negligence. 2 03 The Chapel Hill Herald explains that the debate over
comparative negligence is "about allowing a judge to be fair to
both parties." 20 4 The Durham Herald-Sun states it well: The conthe few negatives that go
tributory negligence doctrine is "one20 of
5
with living in the Old North State."

B.

Citizen-Jurorsand the Contributory Negligence Doctrine

The contributory negligence doctrine receives vehement criticism for its effect on the public's perception of the ability of the
court system to impart justice to individuals. 20 6 This comes from
the recognition that juries, in order to avoid the harshness of the
contributory negligence doctrine, sometimes practice "substantial
justice"-or "rough justice"-and find the defendant liable even
though contributory negligence is present and no other doctrines
lead to this conclusion, and reduce the damages in proportion to
plaintiff's fault, without any guidance from the court.20 7 One
202. See Fairer Fault System Overdue, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, May 8,
1991, at A16; A Fair Shake Denied - Again, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, May
17, 1991, at A12 ("North Carolina's hard-working, ordinary citizens-its
paycheck people-deserve equitable treatment too."); Defeat PriedFrom Victory,
RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, June 12, 1987, at A14; Fairness Before Costs,
RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Mar. 14, 1983, at A4; Fair Shake for Victims,
RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Mar. 5, 1983, at A4 ("[wihen a law is as unfair as
[the contributory negligence doctrine], it ought to be changed").
203. Time to Root for Justice, WINSTON-SALEM J., May 2, 1991, at 16; see also
Bill on Rights ofAccident Victims Defeated in House, WINSTON-SALEM J., May 16,
1991, at 19.

204. Negligence Law Outdated, CHAPEL HIL HERALD, April 28, 1994, at 4.
205. 'ContributoryNegligence' 125 Years Out of Date, DURHAM HERALD-SUN,
April 25, 1994, at A8; see also Negligence Law Ripe for Change, DURHAM HERALDSUN, April 24, 1994, at 16 ("the argument isn't about siding with either insurance
executives or personal injury lawyers (a terrifying thought), it's about allowing a
judge to be fair to both parties").
206. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1231 (Cal. 1975); Frank E.
Maloney, From Contributoryto ComparativeNegligence: A Needed Law Reform,
11 U. FLA. L. REV. 135, 151-52 (1958).
207. See Li, 532 P.2d at 1231 (citing Keeton, supra note 178, at 505; Prosser,
supra note 2 (this is what "[e]very trial lawyer is well aware" of); Comments,
supra note 2 (comments of Professors Keeton, Malone, and Wade)); VICTOR E.
ScHwARTz,

COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE

§ 21.1 (2d ed. 1986); Wex S. Malone,

Contributory Negligence and the Landowner Cases, 29 MINN. L. REV. 61, 62-66
(1945); Herbert R. Baer, The Relative Roles of Legal Rules and Non-Legal Factors
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judge observed that "as a practical matter . . .juries have long
been applying the doctrine of comparative negligence in reaching
20 8
their verdicts."
Jurors doing "substantial justice" are left with the feeling that
they took the just course, but may remain uncomfortably aware
that they did not strictly follow the judge's instructions long after
they leave the courthouse. Avoiding a judge's instructions is certainly nothing to be proud of, and is a cause for serious concern.
One commentator explains that "there is something basically
wrong with a rule of law that is so contrary to the settled convictions of the lay community that laymen will almost always refuse
to enforce it, even when solemnly told to do so by a judge whose
instructions they have sworn to follow." 20 9 Importantly, this
delivery of "substantial" justice is much too random and fleeting to
deserve North Carolina's reliance.2 10
More often, juries strictly follow the judge's instructions in
this regard, 2 1. but may walk away from the county courthouse
with the injustice of the contributory negligence doctrine forever
in Accident Litigation, 31 N.C. L. REV. 46 (1952); John Drescher, Jr., House
Endorses Bill to Expand Accident Compensation, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER,
July 2, 1985, at C4 (proponents of a comparative fault bill in the North Carolina
General Assembly stated that "juries sometimes d[o] not pay attention to what
the judge told them about... contributory, negligence and award[ ] damages to
people who contributed to an accident").
208. Walter L. Tooze, Contributory Versus ComparativeNegligence-A Judge
Expresses His Views, 12 NACCA L.J. 211, 212 (1953). Justice Lewis F. Powell,
Jr., before his appointment to the United States Supreme Court, noted that "the
average jury will usually award some damages regardless of contributory
negligence." Lewis F. Powell, Jr., ContributoryNegligence: A Necessary Check on
the American Jury, 43 A.B.A.J. 1005, 1006 (1957).
This phenomena has raised other difficulties as well. See Noel Fidel,
Preeminently a Political Institution: The Right of Arizona Juries to Nullify the
Law of ContributoryNegligence, 23 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1 (1991).
209. Maloney, supra note 206, at 151-52.
210. North Carolina Representative H. Martin Lancaster (D-Wayne), in
supporting a bill providing for the comparative negligence doctrine in North
Carolina, noted that this phenomenon "creates inequities from case to case." See
Drescher, supra note 207, at C4. Representative Lancaster explained that "[a]ll
this bill does is say every plaintiff is going to be fed out of the same spoon. This is
pure fairness and equity." Id.
211. See Kalven, Comment, supra note 2, at 902; Elizabeth Leland, Accident
Lawsuit Renews Call for Comparative Fault System, RALEIGH NEWS &
OBSERVER, Feb. 15, 1983, at C1 (describing North Carolina case where jury
wanted to award widow damages, but followed the contributory negligence
doctrine).
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imbedded in their minds. Both "substantial justice" juries and
strict juries may feel rather uncomfortable with their experience
with the contributory negligence doctrine.
Feelings such as these promote a distrust in citizen-jurors
regarding the judicial system's ability to provide them, their families and neighbors fair resolution of their future problems. Any
distrust or lost confidence in our judicial system is unhealthy.
C. Limitations Criticized
The many limitations on the contributory negligence doctrine
developed by the courts to reduce the harshness of contributory
negligence are cumbersome and complicated in application, and
often confuse the jury.212 Last clear chance, shifting burdens for
minor plaintiffs, willful and wanton defendants, and the rescue
doctrine, added to the interpretation of proximate cause and other
terminology, are understandably difficult for a jury to digest.
Last clear chance, a doctrine long-applied in North Carolina,2 13 is often ridiculed. One group of well-known commentators

laments the "variety of irreconcilable rules [associated with the
'last clear chance' doctrine].., and the lack of any rational fundamental theory to support them."21 4 North Carolina courts have
also noted the difficulties with the last clear chance doctrine. 5
Moreover, the last clear chance doctrine results in an all-ornothing risk for a negligent defendant. A defendant who had the
last clear chance is liable for 100% of a contributorily negligent
plaintiff's damages even if the plaintiff's negligence accounts for
99% of the negligence. It is not "easy to defend a rule which
absolves the plaintiff entirely of his own negligence, and places
the whole loss upon the defendant, whose fault may be the lesser
2 16
of the two."

212. See Green, supra note 73, at 32 ("The rules of law pertaining to negligence
conduct ... have been made complex, difficult of understanding and application
by a useless resort to the mysticism of words.").
213. See Bowden v. Bell, 116 N.C. App. 64, 67, 446 S.E.2d 816, 819 (1994)
(citing Gunter v. Wicker, 85 N.C. 310 (1881)); supra, part I.C.1.; see generally
DAYE & MORRIS, supra note 5, § 19.21.35.
214. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, at 468.
215. See supra notes 73 - 82 and accompanying text.
216. KEETON Er AL., supra note 3, at 468.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss1/1

32

1996]

Gardner: Contributory Negligence, Comparative Negligence, and Stare Decisi
CONTRIBUTORY AND COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE

III.

THE

33

COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE DOCTRINE

The virtues of the comparative negligence doctrine over the
contributory negligence doctrine are well-documented in the
sources cited in parts I and II of this article and are thus not
repeated in detail here. The comparative negligence doctrine's
highest quality is that it is premised on the principle that parties
at fault should be responsible for the cost of the injuries sustained
as a result of their fault.21 7 It is an effective solution to the
problems associated with the contributory negligence doctrine.
The comparative negligence doctrine offers a fair method of apportionment-each party is responsible for the damages attributable
to that party's proportionate negligence. The doctrine avoids
allowing a highly negligent defendant to escape all responsibility
for the injuries caused by the defendant's negligence when the
plaintiff is also negligent. Importantly, the comparative negligence doctrine allows citizen-jurors to impart justice with pride
and confidence in the civil justice system. The doctrine also
reduces the confusion associated with the variety of contributorynegligence limitations.
This part begins by describing the types of comparative negligence systems. Next, it surveys the history of the doctrine and its
modern pervasiveness. Finally, this part examines the legislative
history of the comparative negligence bills introduced in the North
Carolina General Assembly, and one of the principle arguments
against their adoption, the "insurance-costs" argument.
A.

Types of Comparative Negligence Systems

Comparative negligence systems compare the fault attributable to the plaintiff to the fault attributable to the defendant and
provide for the division of damages. 21s Thus, the comparative
negligence doctrine is often, and more accurately, called "comparative fault." There are two general types of comparative negligence systems, "pure" and "modified."
The pure comparative negligence system provides that a
plaintiff may recover the portion of the plaintiff's damages caused
by the defendant's fault.2" 9 The plaintiff's contributory negligence
does not completely bar the plaintiff's recovery, but instead
reduces the plaintiff's damages in proportion to the plaintiff's
217. See WOODS, supra note 13, § 1:1.

218. See SchiwARTz, supra note 207, § 2.1, at 29.
219. See id. § 3.2, at 48.
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fault.2 2 ° Under the pure system, the plaintiff is not barred from
recovery even if the plaintiff's negligence is greater than that of
the defendant's. 22 1 The pure comparative negligence system is
recognized as "undoubtably the fairest and most equitable system."2 2 2 Twelve states follow the pure comparative negligence
doctrine. 22 3 Several federal statutes adopt.this system. 2 24 The
Uniform Comparative Fault Act provides for this system. 22 5 The
United States Supreme Court adopted pure comparative negligence for admiralty suits. 226 Many foreign countries apply pure
comparative negligence.2 2 7
Modified comparative negligence systems. likewise provide
that a plaintiff may recover the portion of the plaintiff's damages
caused by the defendant's fault.2 28 Under modified systems, however, if the plaintiff's fault exceeds a certain proportion, the plaintiff's contributory negligence bars the plaintiff's recovery. There
are three types of modified comparative negligence systems: "not
greater than," "not as great as," and "slight/gross."
The "less than or equal to" system-or the "fifty percent" system-provides that a contributorily negligent plaintiff can recover
damages if the plaintiff's fault is less than or equal to the defendant's fault; the plaintiff's damages are reduced by the percentage

220. Id.
221. Id.
222. WOODS, supra note 13, § 1:11, at 27; see also Juenger, supra note 2, at 4950; Prosser, supra note 2, at 494, 508; John Wade, A Uniform ComparativeFault
Act-What Should it Provide?, 10 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 220, 225 (1977); Keeton,
Comments, supra note 2, at 911.
223. See WOODS, supra note 13, § 1:11, at 27-28. Alaska, California, Florida,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, New York,
Rhode Island, and Washington are pure comparative negligence jurisdictions.
Id.
224. See SCHwARTZ, supra note 207, § 3.2, at 49-50 (citing FELA, the Merchant
Marine Act, the Jones Act, and the Federal Death on the High Seas Act).
225. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT AcT § 1 (1977).

226. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 411 (1975)
(unanimous opinion).
227. See SCHWARTZ,

supra note 207, § 3.2, at 50.
228. It is generally recognized that modified systems are the result of political
compromise. See ScHwARrz, supra note 207, § 3.1, at 47; Prosser, supra note 2,
at 494.
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of the fault attributable to the plaintiff.2 2 9 Twenty-one states follow the "not greater than" system.23 o

The "less than" system-or the "forty-nine percent" systemprovides that a contributorily negligent plaintiff can recover damages if the plaintiff's fault is less than the defendant's fault; the
plaintiff's damages are reduced by the percentage of the fault
attributable to the plaintiff. 23 1 Eleven states follow the "less than"

system.2 3 2 The "less than" system presents some practical difficulties.2 3 3 Based on their experience, nine states that originally
adopted the "less than" system have since switched to the "less
than or equal to" system.2 3 4
The "slight/gross" system provides that a contributorily negligent plaintiff can recover damages caused bythe defendant's gross
fault if the plaintiff's fault is slight in comparison to the defendant's fault; otherwise, the plaintiff cannot recover damages
against the defendant.2 35 Only two states, Nebraska2 3 6 and South

Dakota, 23 7 adopted the "slight/gross" system. The "slight/gross"
23 8
system has many peculiar problems and is difficult to apply.

229. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 207, § 2.1, at 31-32, § 3.5, at 67-76; KEETON ET
supra note 3, § 67, at 473.
230. WOODS, supra note 13, § 1:11, at 28-29. Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming follow the "less than or
equal to" system. Id. Nine of these states formally followed the "less than"
system. Id.
231. See ScHwARTz, supra note 207, § 2.1, at 31-32, § 3.5, at 67-76; KEETON ET
AL., supra note 3, § 67, at 473.
232. WOODS, supra note 13, § 1:11, at 29-30. Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado,
Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, North Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and West
Virginia follow the "less than" system. Id.
233. See infra note 436.
234. WOODS, supra note 13, § 1:11, at 28-29.
235. ScHwARTz, supra note 207, § 2.1, at 30-31; KEETON ET AL., supra note 3,
§ 67, at 474.
236. See WOODS, supra note 13, at 674. Nebraska altered its statute in 1964 to
provide for the comparison of the plaintiff's slight negligence and the defendant's
ordinary negligence. Id.
237. See WOODS, supra note 13, at 739. Like Nebraska, South Dakota
amended its statute to provide for comparison between the plaintiff's slight
negligence and the defendant's ordinary negligence. Id.
238. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 207, § 2.1, at 30-31, § 3.4, at 59-66.
AL.,
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History of the ComparativeNegligence Doctrine

Roots of the comparative negligence doctrine can be traced
back fifteen centuries to Roman law. 239 The development of modern comparative negligence laws is traced to eighteenth-century
English admiralty law. Eighteenth-century English admiralty
courts divided the damages equally when both parties were negligent.2 4 0 The United States Supreme Court adopted this admiralty
rule in 1855.241 English courts followed this rule until 1911, when
England adopted a statute that provided for the division of damages "in proportion to the degree in which each vessel was at
24 2
fault."

The Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), adopted by the
United States Congress in 1908, enacted a comparative negligence
system for all negligence actions brought in state or federal courts
against railroads by their employees for injuries sustained while
engaged in interstate commerce.2 4 3 FELA was a reactive measure
implemented to combat common-law doctrines such as the contributory negligence doctrine which had led to many injustices in
suits brought by injured railroad employees.2 4 4 Many states,
including North Carolina, followed Congress's lead by enacting
comparative negligence statutes covering railroad employees
engaged in intrastate commerce.2 4 5
In 1910, Mississippi became the first state to adopt the comparative negligence doctrine generally when the Mississippi legis239. See WOODS, supra note 13, § 1:9 ("The great Digest of Justinian,
completed in 533 A.D., which ambitiously undertook to digest all juristic Roman
law to that date, provided that a party should assume damages in proportion to
his fault and that where damages cannot be apportioned they should be divided
equally."); cf Turk, supra note 2, at 218-25 (origin of comparative negligence
doctrine is the medieval sea codes).
240. Prosser, supra note 2, at 475. Early-seventeenth-century English
admiralty law divided the damages evenly even where only one party's ship could
be faulted. See id. at 475 & n.45 (citations omitted).
241. See The Schooner Catharine, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1854).
242. See Prosser, supra note 2, at 476 (citation omitted).
243. 35 Stat. 66, ch. 149, § 3 (1908), codified at 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1988). Congress
also enacted the comparative negligence doctrine in the Jones Act, 38 Stat. L.
1185, ch. 153, § 20 (1915), codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988), and the Death
on the High Seas Act, 41 Stat. 537, ch. 111, § 6 (1920), codified at 46 U.S.C. app.
§ 766 (1988).
244. WooDs, supra note 13, § 1:11, at 24.
245. See Prosser, supra note 2, at 478-79. For a description of North Carolina's
legislation in this area, see supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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lature enacted a pure comparative negligence statute.2 4 6 Between
1910 and 1968, six other states rejected the contributory negligence doctrine for some form of the comparative negligence
doctrine.2 4 7
Beginning in 1969, the United States witnessed state after
state reject the contributory negligence doctrine for the comparative negligence doctrine. 2 48 Some of these states rejected the contributory negligence doctrine for the comparative negligence
doctrine by statute. Others did so by a decision of the state's
supreme court.
Four states adopted comparative negligence in 1969, joined by
one state in 1970, and four more states in 197 1.249 The "stampede" had begun. 250 Eleven states adopted comparative negligence in 1973, followed by one state in 1974, four states in 1975,
one state in 1976, and three states in 1979.251 By the end of 1985,
nine more states had made the switch,2 5 2 bringing the number of
246. See generally WOODS, supra note 13, at 24 (citing Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-715 (1972)). The Georgia Supreme Court devised a comparative negligence
system for Georgia by broadly construing an 1860 railroad accident statute that
provided for comparative negligence. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 67, at
471; WOODS, supra note 13, § 1:11, at 24.
247. These states are: Georgia (1913), Nebraska (1913), Wisconsin (1931),
South Dakota (1941), Arkansas (1955), and Maine (1965). Judge Woods
describes the negligence-law history of each state in the Appendix of his treatise.
See WOODS, supra note 13, at 499-788. The development of the comparative
negligence doctrine in Georgia is rather interesting, see id. at 558-60, but a full
discussion of the topic is beyond the scope of this article. Georgia is given a date
of 1913 because that is the year of the second of two Georgia Supreme Court
opinions cited as adopting the comparative negligence standard generally in
Georgia. See id. at 559 (citing Elk Cotton Mills v. Grant, 140 Ga. 727, 79 S.E.
836 (1913)).
248. See ScHwARTz, supra note 207, § 1.1. at 1-3.
249. Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and New Hampshire rejected
contributory negligence for comparative negligence in 1969. Id. § 1.1, at 2.
Vermont followed in 1970. Id. Colorado, Idaho, Oregon, and Rhode Island
followed in 1971. Id.
250. Id. § 1.1, at 3.
251. Connecticut, Florida, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming rejected contributory negligence for
comparative negligence in 1973. Id. at 2-3. They were followed by Kansas in
1974, Alaska, California, Montana, and New York in 1975, Pennsylvania in 1976,
and Louisiana, Michigan, and West Virginia in 1979 (Louisiana's switch became
effective in 1980). Id. at 2-3.
252. Ohio rejected contributory negligence for comparative negligence in 1980,
followed by Illinois and New Mexico in 1981, Iowa in 1982, Indiana and Missouri
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states rejecting the contributory negligence doctrine for the comparative negligence doctrine to forty-four.
In 1986, the contributory negligence roster included only six
states: Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected
contributory negligence for comparative negligence in 1991.253
The Tennessee Supreme Court followed suit in 1992.254
Today, the contributory negligence doctrine has been rejected
by forty-six states. It is codified in federal negligence statutes, followed by the United States Supreme Court in admiralty suits, and
prevails in nearly all of the major civilized countries. North Carolina, however, still follows the contributory negligence doctrine.
C.

The ComparativeNegligence Doctrine in the North Carolina
General Assembly

There have been several attempts to progress North Carolina
to a comparative fault system in the North Carolina General
Assembly. The North Carolina Senate and the North Carolina
House of Representatives each considered comparative fault bills.
Some bills passed one house, only to face defeat in the other.
Some bills died in committee. None passed both houses to become
law.2 5 5 This section describes the legislative history of comparative negligence bills in the General Assembly, concentrating on
the 1980s and one of the principal arguments presented to the
General Assembly in opposition to the bills during that time.
1.

A Legislative History

The first comparative negligence bill in the North Carolina
General Assembly was introduced in the North Carolina House of
Representatives in 1933.256 The bill received an unfavorable
in 1983 (Indiana's switch became effective in 1985), and Arizona, Delaware, and
Kentucky in 1984. Id. at 2-3.
253. See supra notes 165 - 168 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 169 - 170 and accompanying text.
255. North Carolina is the only state where the governor has no veto power.
See JACK D. FLEER, NORTH CAROLINA GOvERNMENT & POLITICS 115 (1994).
256. HOUSE JOURNAL 71 (1933). The bill, H.B. 177 (1933), was referred to the
Judiciary I Committee. Id.
A 1932 law review article authored by the law faculty of the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law in the North CarolinaLaw Review
had urged the legislature to reject contributory negligence for comparative
negligence. For a description of the article's contents, see supra notes 187 - 193
and accompanying text.
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report from the examining committee and was never addressed by
the full House.2 5 7 In 1953, a bill providing for the adoption of comparative negligence passed the House and was sent on to the
North Carolina Senate.2 5 The Senate committee examining the
House bill, however, gave the bill an unfavorable report to the full
Senate and the full Senate never considered the bill.2 5 9 Four
years later, in 1957, a bill providing for comparative fault was
introduced in the House, 26 0 but received an unfavorable report
from the examining committee 2 6 1 and was not considered by the
full House. Comparative fault bills were again introduced in the
House or Senate in 1973, 1977, and 1979.262 These bills, however,
received little attention.2 63
The issue of comparative negligence received much attention
in the North Carolina General Assembly during the 1980s. Most
of the comparative negligence bills came within two or three votes
of becoming law. The history of these bills is a very interesting
study.
In the 1981 legislative session, nine members of the House
introduced a bill to provide for modified comparative negli257. HOUSE JOURNAL 264 (1933). No further action on the bill was taken.
258. HOUSE JOURNAL 744-45, 764, 766 (1953); see Negligence Bill Tops Hurdle,
RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, April 9, 1953, at 20; Legislative Record, RALEIGH
NEWS & OBSERVER, April 10, 1953, at 11. The bill was H.B. 109 (1953).
259. SENATE JOURNAL 473, 506, 532 (1953).
260. HOUSE JOURNAL 601 (1957). The bill was H.B. 858 (1957).

261. HOUSE

JOURNAL

718 (1957).

262. In 1973, H.B. 995 (1973), S. 539,(1973) and S. 704 (1973), providing for
comparative negligence, were introduced and referred to committee in the House
and Senate, respectively, but received no further attention. HOUSE JOURNAL 408
(1973); SENATE JOURNAL 190, 261 (1973). In 1977, H.B. 568 (1977), providing for
comparative negligence, was introduced to the House and referred to committee,
HOUSE JOURNAL 287 (1977), but the committee gave the bill an indefinite
postponement report, id. at 1170. In 1979, a comparative negligence bill
introduced in the House, H.B. 821 (1979), HOUSE JOURNAL 306 (1979), was
altered to provide for a study commission, id. at 824, but was postponed
indefinitely, id. at 1017. However, Resolution 65 (House Joint Resolution 1177)
of the 1979 General Assembly authorized the North Carolina Research
Commission to study the issue and report its findings to the General Assembly.
The Legislative Research Commission recommended that North Carolina adopt a

comparative

negligence system.

NORTH

CAROLINA

LEGISLATIVE

RESEARCH

(1981)
(unpaginated) (on file with the Campbell Law Review) [hereinafter RESEARCH
COMMISSION,

LAWS OF EVIDENCE

AND

COMPARATIVE

NEGLIGENCE

COMMISSION].

263. See supra note 262.
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gence. 2664 The House Committee on the Judiciary III examined the

bill and sent a favorable committee report to the full House.26 5
The full House approved the bill by a 78-26 margin and sent the
bill to the Senate.2 6 6 The Senate Judiciary III Committee
examined the House bill and reported the bill unfavorably to the
full Senate, but reported a substitute bill favorably. 2 6 7 After
approximately two hours of debate, the Senate rejected the bill by
a 23-19 margin.26 8 Opponents of the bill argued that the bill was
"aimed at increasing lawyers' business."269 One senator argued
that "'[n]obody cares but the trial lawyers. The public of North
Carolina will not be the ones to profit from this bill.' "270 Opponents argued also that insurance premiums would rise dramatically if the bill passed. 1
In the 1983 legislative session, nine senators introduced a bill
to provide for modified comparative negligence to the Senate. 2
The Senate Judiciary III Committee received the bill for examina264. The bill was H.B. 377 (1981). See HOUSE JOURNAL 167 (1981).
Almost all of the comparative negligence bills introduced in the North
Carolina General Assembly during the 1980s provided for the "less than"-or
"forty-nine percent"-modified comparative negligence system. For a description
of the "less than" system, and some of the difficulties with the "less than" system,
see supra notes 232-234 and accompanying text and infra note 438.
265. HOUSE JOURNAL 237 (1981).
266. The bill passed the second reading by a margin of 79-32 on March 25,
1981, HOUSE JOURNAL 245 (1981); Comparative Fault, RALEIGH NEWS &
OBSERVER, Mar. 26, 1981, at A9; House Acts on Damages ClaimsBill, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Mar. 26, 1981, at D2, and, following the 'rejection of a proffered
amendment, passed the third reading, 78-26, on March 26, 1981, HOUSE
JOURNAL 254 (1981).
267. SENATE JOURNAL 229, 616 (1981) (The bill that passed the House provided
that the plaintiff must be more negligent than the defendant for the action to be
barred. The Senate's substitute bill provided that the plaintiff's action is barred
if the plaintiff and the defendant were equally negligent, and made the bill
inapplicable to product liability actions).
268. SENATE JOURNAL 644 (1981); Sherry Johnson, Senate Kills Comparative
FaultProposal, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, June 19, 1981, at 25.
269. Johnson, supra note 268, at 25.
270. Johnson, supra note 268, at 25 (quoting Senator T. Cass Ballenger (RCatawba)).
271. Johnson, supra note 268, at 25.
272. The bill was S. 145 (1983). See SENATE JOURNAL 100 (1983). Sixty-four
house members introduced a similar bill, H.B. 319 (1983), in the North Carolina
House of Representatives. HOUSE JOURNAL 130 (1983). However, in light of
events in the 1981 session, the House waited to see what action the Senate would
take.
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tion. 2 73 Opponents of the bill speaking before the committee noted
that the bill's sponsors were lawyers and asserted that" '[there is
no public outcry for changes in the law.' ",274 Opponents contended
also that insurance premiums would rise dramatically, along with
litigation and taxes.2 7 5 Proponents of the bill argued that there
was no proof that other states incurred such substantial increases
in insurance costs when they changed to comparative negligence.2 7 6 Proponents also pointed to a tragic situation where contributory negligence prevented a North Carolina family's recovery
of damages for the death of their husband and father.2 7 7 After
some arguments over procedure, the committee voted to report the
bill favorably to the full Senate.2 7 s Several members of the committee complained that the five days that the committee spent
examining the bill were insufficient. 9
Before the full Senate voted on the bill, the bill was recommitted to the Judiciary III Committee on the motion of Senator Henson P. Barnes (D-Wayne), the bill's sponsor. 280 This recommit
occurred in response to efforts by opponent of the bill and chairman of the Senate appropriations panel, Senator Harold W. Hardison (D-Lenoir).2 8 ' Senator Hardison called the bill "'the best
lawyers' welfare bill I've ever seen in my life.' "282 He announced
that he obtained an estimate from the Governor's Office of Budget
and Management that the bill may cost state government an extra
273. SENATE JOURNAL 100 (1983).
274. F. Alan Boyce, Negligence Law Change Endorsed,

RALEIGH NEWS &
Mar. 9, 1983, at C1 (quoting an attorney representing a railroad
company before the committee).
275. Boyce, supra note 274, at C1.
276. Id.
277. Id. at Cl; Elizabeth Leland, Accident Lawsuit Renews Calls for
ComparativeFault System, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Feb. 15, 1983, at C1. In
1979, Charles M. "Chuck" Short, Jr., was killed when his truck slammed into a
bridge. Leland, supra, at C1. Mr. Short was returning his truck to the dealer to
have a sticky accelerator fixed for the fourth time. Id. A jury found that the
dealership had been negligent. Id. However, the jury-which deliberated for
seven hours-found that Short was partly to blame for the accident and, thus,
the contributory negligence doctrine prevented his widow from collectingdamages against the dealership. Id. A juror explained that the jury "wanted to
award damages to the widow but felt constrained by the law." Id.
OBSERVER,

278.

SENATE JOURNAL

140 (1983); Boyce, supra note 274, at Cl.

279. Boyce, supra note 274, at C1.

280.

SENATE JOURNAL

150, 163 (1983).

281. Cost Estimate Stalls Bill, Piques Legislator, RALEIGH
Mar. 12, 1983, at Al [hereinafter Cost Estimate].
282. Id. at Al, A13 (quoting Senator Hardison).
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Under Senate rules, a
bill that would cost state government more than is already provided in the budget must receive approval from the appropriations
committee.28 4 Other members of the legislature disapproved of
Senator Hardison's maneuver because of the use of budget estimates from outside the legislative staff and "'using the budget
process in taking sides on a bill.' "285 Senator Hardison explained
that he was "'just protecting the taxpayer.' "286
The Judiciary III Committee amended the bill to exempt state
government from the change and again provided a favorable
report of the bill, as amended, to the full Senate.28 7 The Senate
rejected the amendment to exempt state government by a 25-22
margin. 288 Then, in a move recognized as the killing of the bill,
the Senate referred the bill to the Senate Insurance Committee,
from which the bill never emerged.28 9
The initial action on comparative negligence returned to the
House in 1985. Twenty-nine members introduced a bill to provide
for modified comparative negligence. 290 The House Committee on
the Judiciary IV examined the bill and reported it to the full
House with a favorable report.2 9 1 Opponents of the bill asserted,
as they had in previous debates, that comparative negligence
would cause insurance rates to rise.2 9 2 One house member opposing the bill argued that it is not "'an acceptable process where a
person can gain by his own misadventures or negligence.' "293 Pro283. Id. The bill's sponsor, Senator Barnes, received cost estimates from
legislative fiscal experts which projected a $100,000.00 to $300,000.00 increase.
A.L. May, ComparativeFaultBill's Chances Slim, Sponsor Says, RALEIGH NEWS
& OBSERVER, Apr. 29, 1983, at C14.
284. Cost Estimate, supra note 281, at Al, A13; SENATE JOURNAL 150-151
(1983) (citing Senate Rule 42.1).
285. Cost Estimate, supra note 281, at A13 (quoting Rep. J. Allen Adams (DWake)).
286. Id. at A13.
287. SENATE JOURNAL 290 (1983); May, supra note 283, at C14.
288. SENATE JOURNAL 299 (1983); May, supra, note 283, at C14.

289.

SENATE JOURNAL

299 (1983).

290. HOUSE JOURNAL 418 (1985). The bill was H.B. 1176 (1985).
291. HOUSE JOURNAL.774 (1985).
292. See John Drescher, Jr., House Endorses Bill to Expand Accident
Compensation, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, July 2, 1985, at C4; House Approves
Changes in Accident Compensation, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, July 3, 1985, at
A17 [hereinafter House Approves].
293. House Approves, supra note 292, at A17 (quoting Representative George
W. Miller, Jr. (D-Durham)).
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ponents of the bill argued that" '[tihe doctrine of contributory negligence . . . rewards the negligent'" by allowing negligent
defendants to go free from liability.2 9 4 Proponents pointed out
that a 1981 Legislative Research Commission study found that
businesses' insurance costs rose a maximum of five percent in
states where comparative negligence was adopted.2 9 5 One representative stated that "'[i]f this bill is not passed, you may as well
place a wreath on the doors of the legislative hall because justice
is dead in North Carolina.' "296 The House approved the bill by a
71-40 margin and sent the bill on to the Senate.2 9 7
The Senate referred the bill to the Senate Judiciary IV Committee. 298 The committee voted without debate to report the bill
unfavorably to the full Senate by a 4-3 margin.2 9 9 Under Senate
rules, however, three members of a committee can ask the full
Senate to consider a bill even if the bill is reported unfavorably by
the committee.3 0 0 The three-person minority exercised this option
and sent a favorable minority report to the full Senate. 3 ° '
Considerable dislike for the use of this rarely-used maneuver
was voiced by members of the Senate.30 2 Much of the debate on
the Senate floor centered around Senate rules and the committee
294. House Approves, supra note 292, at A17.
295. Drescher, supra note 292, at C4. For a description of this study, see infra
part III.C.2.a.
296. Drescher, supra note 292, at C4 (quoting Representative A.M. Hall (DNew Hanover)).
297. HousE JouRNAL 799-800 (1985); House Approves, supra note 292, at A17.
298. SENATE JouRNAL 686 (1985). Lieutenant Governor Robert B. Jordan III,
President of the North Carolina Senate, rejected efforts by proponents of the bill
to send the bill to the Judiciary I Committee where a majority favored the bill.
Charles Babington, Bill on Accident Victims' Claims Likely to be Topic of Senate
Fight, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, July 5, 1985, at D1. Lieutenant Governor
Jordan also rejected efforts by opponents of the bill to send the bill to the
Commerce Committee headed by Senator Hardison, who led efforts against the
bill in 1981 and 1983. Id.
299. Babington, supra note 298, at D1. Senator Dennis J. Winner (DBuncombe) knew that a majority of the committee opposed the bill and, although
a proponent of the bill, moved for an unfavorable recommendation to the full
Senate to avoid tying the bill up in committee. Id. Senator Winner then voted
against his own motion. Id. Senate majority leader and bill-opponent Senator
Kenneth C. Royall, Jr. (D-Durham) stated that "'[i]n my 19 years of legislative
experience... this is the most unorthodox route I have ever witnessed.'" Id.
300. Id.
301. SENATE JouRNAL 701 (1985).
302. Babington, supra note 298, at D1; Senate ParliamentaryManeuver a
Surprise, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, July 7, 1985, at Al [hereinafter
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One newspaper reported that "senators quarrelled

over the rules, over their integrity and over everything but the
merits of the issue." 04 Senator Barnes moved to refer the bill to
the Judiciary I Committee. 30 5 An opponent of the bill responded
with a motion to table both Senator Barnes' motion and the bill.30 s
The motion to table the bill succeeded, 23-21.3o7 A motion to
reconsider the motion to table ended in a tie, 22-22, and Lieutenant Governor Robert B. Jordan III, President of the Senate,
declined to break the tie, leaving the possibility of full-Senate
reconsideration open.30 8
During a weekend break, proponents of the bill tried without
success to persuade senators to change their minds and vote to
reconsider.30 9 One senator stated that "three senators had told
him that they wanted to change their negative votes on the bill,
but 'they didn't want to get a reputation for flip-flopping.' "310
Thus, the bill remained tabled and consequently died at the end of
the session.
In 1987, nineteen senators introduced a bill to provide for
modified comparative negligence. 3 1 ' The bill exempted suits
Maneuver]. The maneuver is so rare that many members were unfamiliar with
the rule. Id. at A19.
303. Babington, supra note 298, at Dl; Maneuver, supra note 302, at Al, A19.
304. Chuck Alston, Failure to Vote Keeps Comparative Fault Bill Alive,
GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., July 6, 1985, at D1.

305.

SENATE JOURNAL

720 (1985).

306. Id.
307. Charles Babington, Senate Rejects ComparativeFault Bill, RALEIGH NEWS
& OBSERVER, July 6, 1985, at Al [hereinafter Babington, Senate Rejects].
308. SENATE JOURNAL 720 (1985); Babington, Senate Rejects, supra note 307, at
Al. After Lieutenant Governor Jordan announced that the vote to table the bill
had failed, one senator announced that he had wanted to vote for the motion but
had forgot to push his button. Alston, supra note 304, at D1. A motion to
suspend the rules to allow the senator to vote failed for a lack of a two-thirds

majority.

SENATE JOURNAL

720 (1985).

309. Charles Babington, Bill to Expand Accident CompensationDies in Senate
Without Reconsideration,RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, July 9, 1985, at Al.
310. Id. at Al (quoting Senator R.C. Soles, Jr. (D-Columbus)). Senator Soles
said that "one member had told him that lobbying from groups opposed to a
comparative fault law was so intense 'that he had cried over the weekend.'" Id.
311. SENATE JOURNAL 48-49 (1987). The bill, S. 65 (1987), exempted suits
against the state. The same senators introduced S. 66 (1987) which did not
provide the exemption. House members introduced H.B. 96 (1987) and H.B. 97
(1987) to provide for comparative negligence, see HOUSE JOURNAL 62 (1987), but
the House, aware of the history of the previous comparative negligence bills,
waited for the Senate to act on the Senate bills.
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against the state from its coverage.3 12 The Senate Judiciary I
Committee, headed by bill-sponsor Senator Barnes, examined and
unanimously approved the bill.3 13 Senator Barnes, however,
believing that the bill did not have the twenty-sixth vote necessary for its approval, exercised his prerogative as committee chairman and did not immediately send the bill to the full Senate. 1 4
Two weeks after the committee first approved the bill, the committee voted to amend the bill to partially abolish joint and several
liability. 31 5 The committee believed that the amendment, viewed
as favorable to defendants, would appease many opponents of
comparative negligence. 6 The amendment provided that joint
and several liability would be retained in the instance that the
plaintiff was not contributorily negligent. 1 7 Where the plaintiff
was contributorily negligent and one of the defendants was insolvent, however, the uncollectible portion of plaintiff's damages
would be divided between the plaintiff and other defendants in
proportion to their fault.3 1 8 The committee favorably reported the
bill, as amended, to the full Senate.31 9
Upon debate, Senator George B. Daniel (D-Caswell) offered
an amendment to replace the committee's partial abolishment of
joint and several liability with a provision fully abolishing joint
and several liability. 320 The Senate vote on Senator Daniel's
312. S. 65 (1987). S. 66 (1987) did not exempt suits against state government.
313. SENATE JOURNAL 134 (1987); Van Denton, New Twist to Fault Bill
Considered by Barnes, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Mar. 24, 1987, at Al, A7
[hereinafter Denton, New Twist].
314. Denton, New Twist, supra note 313, at A7.
315. Van Denton, Senate Committee Approves Compromise on Fault Bill,
RALEIGH NEWS

&

OBSERVER,

Mar. 25, 1987, at A8 [hereinafter Denton,

Committee Approves].
316. Id.; see also Denton, New Twist, supra note 313, at Al, A7. Senator
Barnes explained that "the concession 'is a change that business and industry,
especially hospitals and doctors will like.'" Senate Panel Approves Comparative
FaultCompromise, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Mar. 25, 1987, at B2 (quoting Senator
Barnes). However, both proponents and opponents of comparative negligence
expressed reservations with the amendment. Id.
317. Denton, Committee Approves, supra note 315, at A8.
318. Id.
319. SENATE JOURNAL 134 (1987). The committee also approved S. 66 (1987),
which did not exempt state government. Van Denton, Committee Approves,
supra note 315, at A8.
320. SENATE JOURNAL 137 (1987); Van Denton, Senate Approves Fault Bill,
RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Mar. 26, 1987, at Al [hereinafter Denton, Senate
Approves].
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amendment ended in a tie, 25-25.321 Lieutenant Governor Jordan, as Senate President, cast the deciding vote in favor of full
abolishment of joint and several liability.2 2 Lieutenant Governor
Jordan later said that he had asked Senator Daniel to sponsor the
amendment.2 3 The Senate approved the bill, as amended, by a
37-10 margin.3 2 4
The House received the bill and sent it to the House Judiciary
IV Committee. 2 5 The committee, chaired by Representative Dennis A. Wicker (D-Lee), who sponsored a comparative negligence
bill in the House, reported the Senate's bill unfavorably to the full
House, but favorably reported a substitute bill; the substitute bill
provided for comparative negligence but rejected the Senate Bill's
provision abolishing joint and several liability.3 2 6 The full House
rejected the committee's substitute bill by a margin of 68-45.327
"Lawmakers attributed the vote to a strong lobbying effort by
business groups; ...lobb[ying] ... by Gov. James G. Martin...;
and proponents' refusal to accept a Senate compromise that weakened the bill but might have drawn more supporters."3 2 s The bill
received no further attention from the House.
Comparative negligence bills were introduced in the House in
1989 and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. 3 29 The
321. SENATE JOURNAL 137 (1987); Denton, Senate Approves, supra note 320, at
Al.
322. SENATE JOURNAL 137 (1987); Denton, Senate Approves, supra note 320, at
Al.
323. Denton, Senate Approves, supra note 320, at Al; Tim Funk, Senate Gives
Tentative Approval to Comparative Fault Measure, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Mar.
26, 1987, at 40.
324. SENATE JOURNAL 142 (1987); Van Denton, 'Comparative Fault' Measure
Passes Senate on 37-10 Vote, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Mar. 27, 1987, at All
[hereinafter Denton, Measure Passes].
325. HOUSE JOURNAL 161 (1987); Denton, Measure Passes, supra note 324, at
All.
326. HOUSE JOURNAL 941 (1987); Van Denton, House Kills ComparativeFault
Plan, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, June 11, 1987, at Al [hereinafter Denton,
House Kills].
327. HOUSE JOURNAL 958 (1987); Denton, House Kills, supra note 326, at Al;
Comparative Fault Bill Defeated, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, June 11, 1987, at C8
[hereinafter Bill Defeated].
328. Denton, House Kills, supra note 326, at Al. The bill got caught up also in
an attempt at political bargaining over an unrelated issue. Van Denton, GOP,
Freshmen, Discontent Beat Fault Bill, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, June 12,
1987, at Al, A6 (superior court appointments).
329. The bills were H.B. 1236 (1989) and H.B. 1237 (1989). HOUSE JOURNAL
385 (1989). H.B. 1236 excepted state torts, while H.B. 1237 did not. Id.
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House, however, perhaps weary of the issue, did not consider the
330
bills.
To date, comparative negligence proponents in the General
Assembly have made only one attempt to pass a comparative negligence bill in the 1990s. In 1991, a comparative negligence bill
was introduced in the House. 3 3 1 Despite a favorable report from
the committee examining the bill, 2 the bill failed in the House by
a 34-73 margin.3 33 Proponents of the bill blamed the bill's defeat
on heavy lobbying by the bill's opponents.3 3 4 The bill's sponsor,
Representative Harry Payne (D-New Hanover), stated that
"'[tihis is the most heavily lobbied issue I've ever seen.' ,35
2.

Comparative Negligence and the Insurance Rates
Argument in North Carolina

a.

Influencing the North CarolinaGeneral Assembly's debate
over comparative negligence bills

One of the principal road blocks to the passage of a comparative negligence bill in the North Carolina General Assembly during the 1980s was the argument that the adoption of the
contributory negligence doctrine will cause insurance rates, particularly automobile insurance rates, to increase significantly.
This perception was fueled by a group of studies led by a professor
at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Dr. Joseph E.
Johnson, issued every other year during the 1980s predicting that
automobile liability insurance in North Carolina will sharply
increase following a change to a comparative negligence system.3 36 These studies were presented to the General Assembly,
330. The bills apparently never left the Committee on the Judiciary.
331. HOUSE JOURNAL 354 (1991). The bill was H.B. 984 (1991).
332. HOUSE JOURNAL 600 (1991).
333. HOUSE JOURNAL 676 (1991).

334. Van Denton, Fault Bill Rejected by House, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER,
May 16, 1991, at B1.
335. Civil Justice Revisions Defeated in the House, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC.,
May 16, 1991, at D3.
336. Dr. Johnson led such studies issued in the first year of each session of the
North Carolina General Assembly during the 1980s-1981, 1983, 1985, 1987,
and 1989. See Letter from Joseph E. Johnson & Associates to the Honorable
William A. Creech, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary III Committee (April 27,
1981) (on file with the Campbell Law Review); Joseph E. Johnson & Associates,
An Investigation of the Relative Costs of Comparative v. Contributory
Negligence Standards (1983) [hereinafter Investigation] (on file with the
Campbell Law Review); Joseph E. Johnson & George B. Flanigan, Update of an
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and Dr. Johnson testified before committees considering comparative negligence bills.
The Studies compare automobile insurance loss costs of contributory and comparative negligence states. The 1987 Study
serves as an example.
The 1987 Study concluded that North Carolinians' automobile
liability insurance premiums would have been 32.05% to 32.77%
higher in 1985 if North Carolina had changed to a modified comparative negligence system. 3 7 The 1987 Study concluded also
that North Carolinians' automobile liability insurance premiums
would have been 92.71% to 116.58% higher in 1985 if North Caro338
lina had changed to a pure comparative negligence system.
Members of the General Assembly were appropriately troubled by
such alarming predictions.
The 1987 Study sets forth a comparison of automobile premiums 3 39 between states that remained contributory negligence
states from 1971 through 1984 and states that operated under a
comparative negligence system at any time between 1971 and
Investigation of the Relative Costs of Comparative Negligence Standards (1985)
[hereinafter Update] (on file with the Campbell Law Review); Joseph E. Johnson,
Report on the Relative Costs of Adopting Comparative Negligence Standards
(1987) [hereinafter Report] (on file with the Campbell Law Review); Joseph E.
Johnson & William L. Ferguson, Analysis of the Relative Costs of Comparative
Negligence (1989) [hereinafter Analysis] (on file with the Campbell Law Review).
These studies, excluding the 1981 and 1989 Studies, are referred to in this article
as "the Studies." Particular studies are referred to by year.
The 1981 Study is different from the other Studies in that the 1981 Study is
in the form of an opinion letter rather than data analysis. The 1989 Study is also
different in that the methodology used to lead to its conclusions is not revealed.
Dr. Johnson participated in similar studies published in September 1989
and June 1991 which employed some analytical refinements over the 1980s
studies but did not address North Carolina. See Daniel T. Winkler et al., Cost
Effects of Comparative Negligence: Tort Reform in Reverse, 44 CPCU J. 114
(1991); George B. Flanigan et al., Experience from Early Tort Reforms:
Comparative Negligence Since 1974, 56 J. OF RISK & INS. 525 (1989).
337. Report, supra note 336, at 14.
338. Id.
339. The Studies used "pure premium" data. "'Pure premium' refers to the
loss cost for each insured vehicle without accounting for the administrative or
operating expenses of the insurance mechanism." Report, supra note 336, at 2.
The Studies used the weighted average of pure premiums, i.e., the total system
losses divided by earned car years. Id. at 2, 4, 7, 10. Rather than repeat this
designation each time it is referred to, this article uses the term "premium" to
encompass these analytical designations.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss1/1
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1984.340 Although South Carolina remained a contributory negligence state from 1971 to 1984, it is not included in the 1987 Study
because data for that state were not available.3 41 Tennessee is
also not included, presumably because Tennessee had a unique
law providing that remote contributory negligence only mitigates
damages.3 42 The four states included in the study that adhered to
the contributory negligence doctrine from 1971 through 1984 are
3 43
Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia.
The 1987 Study's comparison between such contributory negligence states and pure comparative negligence states is set forth
below:
TABLE 1: 1987 STUDY'S ANALYSIS
AVERAGE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE PREMIUM COST

Year

Consistently
Contributory
States

Pure
Comparative
States

1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984

$ 43.23
$ 45.88
$ 51.86
$ 45.13
$ 50.46
$ 55.62
$ 57.95
$ 64.93
$ 68.91
$ 73.36
$ 79.78
$ 82.05
$ 83.04
$100.63

$ 76.95
$ 79.56
$ 87.73
$ 86.34
$104.34
$109.07
$114.01
$118.43
$129.22
$133.99
$147.97
$162.64
$193.99
$217.94
Average

Percent
Difference
78.00%
73.41%
69.17%
91.31%
106.78%
96.10%
96.74%
82.40%
87.52%
82.65%
85.47%
98.22%
133.61%
116.58%3 44
92.71%

340. The Studies included data from forty-seven states and excludes states
using no-fault insurance systems. Id. at 2. Massachusetts, South Carolina, and
Texas are the three states whose data were not included in the study. Id. at 17.
Their data were not available. Id.
341. Id. at 17.
342. See WOODS, supra note 13, at 744-45. The Studies classify Tennessee as a
modified comparative negligence state. Report, supra note 336, at 17.
343. Indiana statutorily adopted modified comparative negligence in 1983 to
take effect January 1, 1985. WOODS, supra note 13, at 581. It appears that the
Studies did not include Indiana in the states adhering to contributory negligence
from 1971 to 1984. Report, supra note 336, at 17 (listing Indiana as a modified
comparative negligence state as of December 1984, but noting the effective date
as 1985).
344. Report, supra note 336, at 10. This table is a portion of Table 3 of the
1987 Study labelled "Weighted Average of Pure Premiums-Total System
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Based on this comparison, the 1987 Study concluded that North
Carolinians' automobile liability insurance premiums would have
been from 92.71% to 116.58% higher in 1985 if North Carolina had
changed to pure comparative negligence. 34 5 As revealed in Table
1, the 92.71% figure is the average percent difference between the
average premium in Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, and
Virginia and the average premium in all of the pure comparative
negligence states for the years 1971 through 1984. The 116.58%
figure is the percent difference between the average premium in
Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia and the average premium in all of the pure comparative negligence states for
the year 1984.
The Studies' conclusions are not reliable predictions of the
effect of the adoption of the comparative negligence doctrine on
insurance rates in North Carolina. The conclusions made in the
Studies simply do not follow from the Studies' analysis. This is
the result of three related flaws in the Studies' methodology.
First, the Studies use a methodology that compares premium
data between states. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners ("NAICM), an organization that gathers and analyzes
insurance data for the industry, warns that "[c]omparisons of.
average premiums between states can be misleading."3 4 6 The
NAIC explains that the average premium is an "imperfect measure[ ] of the relative 'price' of insurance across states because...
the auto insurance product is not homogenous across states. For
instance, a state's... average premium will be relatively higher if
policyholders in that state tend to purchase higher limits or insure
more expensive cars."3 47 In further explaining the potentially
misleading nature of interstate comparisons, the NAIC noted that
the "type and amount of coverage purchased by an individual is
influenced by various factors, both economic and non-economic." 48 At least one expert has explained that interstate comparisons used in analyzing the effect of the adoption of the
Losses/Earned Care Years by Negligence Systems-Fault Only StatesConsistent Contributory With States Changing Systems 1971 to 1984". Id.
345. Id. at 14.
346. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, STATE AVERAGE
EXPENDITURES & PREMIUMS FOR PERSONAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE IN 1993 6
(1995) [hereinafter NAIC, AVERAGE EXPENDITURES & PREMIUMS].
347. Id.
348. Id.
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comparative negligence doctrine on insurance rates "is likely to be
" 49
very misleading. 3
Second, even if premium data could be compared between
states, the Studies ignore many variables that contribute to premium costs. Consequently, the Studies make untenable assumptions. The premium cost for a particular state depends on a large
number of variables. These variables include population density,
quality of roads, quality of drivers, quality of drivers training,
weather, character of the population density, insurance regulations, competition between insurance companies within the state,
type of fault system, and other laws. 350 The type of fault system is
just one factor. By ignoring all other factors, the Studies consider
all factors but the type of fault system to contribute zero to the
premium cost. This is an incorrect assumption on its face. If this
assumption was true, then the premium cost for North Carolina
would have been the same as the premium cost for New York during the time that both were contributory negligence states. In
fact, New York's premium was more than twice that of North Car35 1
olina's premium during this time.
In this same vein, it is important to note that while the Studies purport to analyze cost impacts on North Carolina automobile
liability insurance, no factors related to North Carolina are taken
into account in concluding the percentage that North Carolinians'
premiums would rise under comparative negligence. The Studies'
offered predictions could apply just as well to any contributory
negligence state.
The third flaw in the Studies is related to the second one, but
includes further analytical errors and results in highly questionable conclusions. The methodology used by the Studies to predict
an increase in premium rates attributes any difference between
the average premium rates of contributory states and the average
premium rate of comparative states to what type of negligence
system the state uses alone, and uses the entire difference to predict the consequences of switching systems.

349. Bernard L. Webb, Contributory Negligence, Comparative Negligence, and
the Cost of Automobile Insurance 7 (1983) (on file with the Campbell Law
Review).
350. NAIC, AVERAGE EXPENDITURES & PREMIUMS, supra note 346, at 2 (citing

seventeen categories of variables).
351. Webb, supra note 349, at Tables 42 and 43.
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Note the large jump in the average comparative negligence
state premium in 1975 as shown by the 1987 Study data.3 5 2 1975
is the year that both California and New York, along with Alaska,
switched to pure comparative negligence systems. 53 Before they
adopted the pure comparative negligence doctrine, both California
and New York were contributory negligence states and had premium rates that were more than double North Carolina's premium rate, and were more than 75% higher than the average
consistent-contributory state. 5 4 The Studies' methodology finds
the entire over-75%-difference attributable to the comparative
negligence doctrine even though the difference was present before
the switch and is obviously attributable to other factors. This
methodology greatly inflates the percentage increase predicted for
North Carolina by the Studies.
A simple example reveals this basic flaw in the Studies' methodology and conclusions. Consider a three-state comparison with
high, medium, and low premium costs where the costs increase by
five percent each year regardless of type of fault system. 3 5 5 The
low-cost and high-cost states are contributory negligence states in
1971 while the medium-cost state is a comparative negligence
state in 1971. The high-cost state switches to comparative negligence in 1978.
TABLE

2:

THREE-STATE EXAMPLE

AVERAGE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE PREMIUM COST

Year
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984

352.
353.
354.
355.

State
One
$10.00
$10.50
$11.03
$11.58
$12.16
$12.76
$13.40
$14.07
$14.77
$15.51
$16.29
$17.10
$17.96
$18.86

State
Two
$15.00
$15.75
$16.54
$17.36
$18.23
$19.14
$20.10
$21.11
$22.16
$23.27
$24.43
$25.66
$26.94
$28.28

State
Three
$20.00
$21.00
$22.05
$23.15
$24.31
$25.53
$26.80
$28.14
$29.55
$31.03
$32.58
$34.21
$35.92
$37.71

Consistently
Contributory
$10.00
$10.50
$11.03
$11.58
$12.16
$12.76
$13.40
$14.07
$14.77
$15.51
$16.29
$17.10
$17.96
$18.86

Comparative
$15.00
$15.75
$16.54
$17.36
$18.23
$19.14
$20.10
$24.62
$25.86
$27.15
$28.51
$29.93
$31.43
$33.00
Average

Percent
Difference
50.00%
50.00%
50.00%
50.00%
50.00%
50.00%
50.00%
75.00%
75.00%
75.00%
75.00%
75.00%
75.00%
75.00%
62.50%

See supra note 344 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 223 and 251 and accompanying text.
See Webb, supra note 349, at Tables 10, 14, 30, 42, 43, and 56.
This example is easily expanded to fifty states.
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Using the Studies' methodology, one would conclude that
State One's automobile liability insurance premiums would have
been from 62.50% to 75.00% higher in 1985 if State One had
changed to pure comparative negligence. This is obviously false.
The 62.50% and 75.00% numbers merely reflect the fact that State
Two's and State Three's premiums are higher than State One's
premium for some reason, and were higher at the point of change
and continued to be higher. The two numbers do not reflect why
State Two's and State Three's premiums are higher. It is likely
that hypothetical State Two and State Three are larger states
than State One, with higher population densities, less hospitable
climates, and higher wages. All three of the states experienced a
constant five percent annual growth rate. There is absolutely no
basis to conclude from this data that a switch from contributory to
comparative negligence would cause State One to experience such
a high rise in insurance premiums. Yet this is exactly the methodology employed by the Studies.
Experts criticize the Studies. Dr. J. Finley Lee, a professor at
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, in examining the
1983 Study, concluded that "the analyzed data and the method
used to analyze the data are not... sufficient or adequate to support the specific conclusions reached."3 5 6 Dr. Lee explained that
"[s]ignificant conceptual problems are encountered in reaching
conclusions such as those posed" in the study.35 7 Dr. Lee noted
3 58
nine "potentially important variables" that the study omitted.
Dr. Lee noted also that several of the larger states "influence the
35 9
data to a disproportionate extent."
Dr. Bernard L. Webb, a professor at Georgia State University,
explained that the Study "has been subjected to substantial criticism on technical grounds."3 60 Dr. Webb concluded that "it is
apparent that interstate comparisons [, upon which the Studies
solely rely,] are not reliable indicators of the cost effects of various
36 1
negligence standards."
356. Letter from J. Finley Lee to the Honorable Henson P. Barnes at 2-3 (Apr.
8, 1983) (on file with the Campbell Law Review).
357. Id. at 1.

358. Id. at 2.
359. Id.
360. Webb, supra, note 349, at 1. Dr. Webb is a professor of actuarial science
and insurance.
361. Id. at 26.
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Unfortunately, members of the North Carolina General
Assembly were influenced by the Studies and relied on the Studies' conclusions in considering the passage of the comparative negligence bills."6 2 It is impossible to know the exact extent of the
Studies' influence. What is important to now realize, however, is
that the Studies caused the debates in the General Assembly over
the comparative negligence bills to be based on flawed assumptions which unarguably affected the legislatures' deliberations
and, considering the extremely close margin of most of the bills'
defeat and the alarming nature of the Studies' conclusions, very
probably affected the outcome of the votes.
b.

Other considerations

Other studies either conclude that switching from contributory to comparative negligence results in minimal effects on insurance rates and burdens on the courts or find the data
inconclusive. 363 For example, in 1981, the North Carolina Legis362. It is not difficult to conclude that such dire predictions would wield
considerable influence over many legislators' thoughts. For example, in 1983 one
senator warned that "the bill could cost North Carolina more than $120 million a
year in higher insurance premiums." Boyce, supra note 274, at C1. The 1983
Study concluded that the adoption of modified comparative negligence would
have meant that North Carolina's automobile insurance premiums would have
been, among other estimates, $117,648,000.00 more in 1980 than they were
under the contributory negligence standard. Investigation, supra note 336, at
11. In 1987 one member of the house "said the bill would result in a 32%
increase in insurance premiums." Bill Defeated, supra note 327, at C8. The
1987 Study concluded that the adoption of modified comparative negligence
would have meant that North Carolinian's automobile insurance premiums
would have been, among other estimates, 32.77% more in 1985 than they were
under the contributory negligence standard. Report, supra note 336, at 14. See
also Richard T. Boyette, A Case Against Comparative Negligence, NORTH
CAROLINA ST. BAR Q., Fall 1991, at 22, 23-24 (setting forth the 1989 Study's
conclusions and citing the Study's conclusions as likely influences over North
Carolina legislators considering a comparative fault bill).
363. See, e.g., Cornelius Peck, Comparative Negligence and Automobile
Liability Insurance, 58 MICH. L. REv. 689, 707-22, 726-28 (1960) (generally, no
effect on insurance rates appears in the data as a result of switching from a
comparative to a contributory negligence system); John E. Rolph et al.,
Automobile Accident Compensation: Who Pays How Much How Soon?, 56 J. OF
RISK & INS. 667, 667, 674 (1985) (empirical evidence on the effects of shifting
from a contributory negligence system to a comparative negligence system is
weak); Webb, supra note 349, at 12, 26 (actual data does not support the
conclusion that insurance costs or claim frequency will increase); Maurice
Rosenberg, Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A "Before and After" Survey.
13 ARK. L. REv. 89, 108-09 (1959) (switching from a contributory negligence to a
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lative Research Commission published a study on comparative
negligence for the General Assembly.364 The committee sent a
questionnaire to the insurance commissioners of the thirty-five
states that had adopted comparative negligence at that time. The
questionnaire requested information on any insurance rate
increase due to switching from contributory to comparative negligence. Of the twenty-four states that responded, only one state,
Alaska, reported a significant increase-approximately five percent-due to switching. Two states, Minnesota and Rhode Island,
reported that no increase resulted from the switch. Fifteen states
reported that they could not determine the effect of the switch on
insurance rates. The insurance commissioner or a representative
often of these fifteen states stated that in their opinion the switch
from contributory to comparative negligence had no impact on
insurance costs. Five of the fifteen states opined a slight increase
in insurance premiums due to comparative negligence. The
remaining six states reported that they had insufficient data upon
which to base an estimate or opinion. Based on this survey, and
other inquiries, the committee concluded it could not "find any
strong evidence to support the contention that insurance rates
would increase substantially as the result of adoption of a comparative negligence system in North Carolina."366
Robert Byrd, former dean of the University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill School of Law, offered an astute observation on this
point. He noted that "if higher costs were indeed the consequence,
it's unlikely there would be a national trend toward comparative
3 66
fault in damage suits."

Moreover, it must be recognized that costs associated with an
injured person unable to recover from the person mostly responsible for the injuries in the civil justice system due to the contribucomparative negligence system did not drastically alter the Arkansas courts'
burdens); Comparative Negligence-A Survey of the Arkansas Experience, 22
ARK. L. REV. 692, 713 (1969) (same conclusion); see also ScHwARTz, supra note
207, § 21.1, at 355; Mutter, supra note 2, at 237-45; cf Stuart Low & Janet K.
Smith, The Relationship of Alternative Negligence Rules to Litigation Behavior
and Tort Claim Disposition, 17 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 63 (1992) (projecting greater
probabilities of attorney involvement, higher average award levels, and longer
delays in securing payment for comparative negligence systems).
364. RESEARCH COMMISSION, supra note 262 (unpaginated). The study came at
the direction of a joint resolution of the General Assembly. See id.
365. RESEARCH COMMISSION, supra note 262 (unpaginated).
366. See FairShake for Victims, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Mar. 5, 1983, at
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tory negligence doctrine are ultimately borne by someone. 6 7 The
injured person bears much of the cost alone. Others, however, are
joined in the person's plight. Hospitals who treat victims of the
contributory negligence doctrine who cannot afford to pay their
hospital bill are collateral victims of the contributory negligence
doctrine. Other creditors also bear some costs of a contributory
negligence system. Taxpayers may bear the cost of unemployment payments, welfare payments, food stamps, Medicare, Medicaid, and similar social programs when the recipient should have
recovered from the defendant partially responsible for the
injuries.
Social costs also may be high. Victims of the contributory
negligence doctrine may face tremendous pressure at home from
remaining out of work for some time with mounting medical and
other bills. Such a situation creates a high-pressure situation for
the victim and the victim's family.
Thus, the adoption of comparative negligence should alleviate
costs borne elsewhere. For example, the ability of a contributorily
negligent plaintiff to pay his share of the hospital bills from a
recovery under comparative negligence should result in a decrease
in medical insurance premiums. A contributorily negligent plaintiff who can avoid resorting to welfare or other social programs
because comparative negligence allowed the plaintiff to recover
the damages attributable to the defendant from the defendant
should result in decreased costs to those programs and translate
into a reduced tax burden for others. It is much more efficient and
just for a party causing the injury to bear the damages attributa368
ble to that party.
Providing a reliable prediction in regard to the effect of the
adoption of a, comparative fault system in North Carolina on
insurance costs is beyond the scope of this article. It seems intuitive that some increase in insurance rates would occur, but this
may be balanced by the recognized practice of "substantial justice"
juries, more settlements, repudiation of the all-or-nothing
367. See William F. Horsely, The Argument for Comparative Fault, NORTH
Q., Fall 1991, at 18, 19.
368. Commentators assert that the comparative negligence doctrine is more
efficient also in providing "incentives for precaution to both parties rather than
strong incentives to one party and weak incentives to the other." Robert D.
Cooter & Thomas S. Ulen, An Economic Case for Comparative Negligence, 61
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1067, 1071, 1079-1101 (1986); see also Daniel Orr, The
Superiority of ComparativeNegligence: Another Vote, 20 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 119
(1991).
CAROLINA ST. BAR.
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approach of the contributory negligence and last clear chance doctrines, and alleviations of costs in tangential areas. The insurance-rate issue is a legitimate and important concern and should
be taken into account when considering changes in North Carolina's civil justice system. This concern, however, must be kept in
perspective and not be considered in a vacuum.
In concluding this section, it is worthwhile to quote the
Supreme Court of Kentucky's view of this issue. The court
explained: "To those who speculate that comparative negligence
we say there are no
will cost more money or cause more36litigation,
9
good economies in an unjust law."
IV.

STARE DECISIS, CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, AND THE
NORTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT

Nearly all of the forty-six states that rejected the contributory
negligence doctrine for the comparative negligence doctrine had
been contributory negligence states for well over a century. 7 °
North Carolina has been a contributory negligence state since at
least 1869.3 11 This long history heightens stare decisis concerns.
A few state supreme courts have cited stare decisis and associated principles to justify clinging to the contributory negligence
doctrine even in the face of outright acknowledgement of the overwhelming criticism and rejection of the doctrine. The North Carolina Supreme Court's staredecisis jurisprudence, however, reveals
that the supreme court should not adhere to the outmoded contributory negligence doctrine when asked to reject it in favor of
the comparative negligence doctrine. This part examines the
supreme court's stare decisis jurisprudence, paying particular
369. Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Ky. 1984).
370. For example, Illinois had followed the contributory negligence doctrine
since at least 1852, see Aurora Branch RailroadCo. v.Grimes, 13 Ill. 585 (1852),
before rejecting it for the comparative negligence doctrine in 1981, see Alvis v.
1981). South Carolina had followed the contributory
Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886 (Ill.
negligence doctrine since at least 1851, see Freerv. Cameron, 38 S.C.L. (4 Rich.)
228 (1851) (dictum), before rejecting it for the comparative negligence doctrine in
1991, see Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 399 S.E.2d 783 (S.C. 1991). Tennessee
had followed the contributory negligence doctrine since at least 1858, see Whirley
v. Whiteman, 38 Tenn. 610 (1858), before rejecting it for the comparative
negligence doctrine in 1992, see McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn.
1992).
371. See Morrison v. Cornelius, 63 N.C. 346 (1869). For a discussion of the
history of the contributory negligence doctrine in North Carolina, see supra part
I.A.
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Stare Decisis Concerns

As appropriate, the North Carolina Supreme Court "has
always attached great importance to the doctrine of stare decisis,
both out of respect for the opinions of [the supreme court's] predecessors and because it promotes stability in the law and uniformity in its application." 3 73 The supreme court "never overrule[s] its
3 74
decisions lightly."
Equally as appropriate, however, the supreme court has long
recognized that one of the foremost strengths of the common law
is its ability to change and adapt in light of experience and reason
in order to further justice. The supreme court has always refused
to take an arbitrary and inflexible approach to stare decisis. 7
In 1856 the supreme court explained:
One excellence of the common law is that it works itselfpure by
drawing from the fountain of reason, so that if errors creep into it,
upon reasons which more enlarged views and a higher state of
enlightenment, growing out of the extension of commerce, and
other causes, prove to be fallacious, they may be worked out by
subsequent decisions.3 76
372. The North Carolina Court of Appeals has appropriately recognized that it
is not empowered to reject the contributory negligence doctrine for the
comparative negligence doctrine. See Corns v. Hall, 112 N.C. App. 232, 237, 435
S.E.2d 88, 90-91 (1993) (citation omitted); see also Cannon v. Miller, 313 N.C.
324, 327 S.E.2d 888 (1985) (court of appeals can never overrule decisions of the
supreme court), vacating 71 N.C. App. 460, 322 S.E.2d 780 (1984).
373. Wiles v. Welparnel Constr. Co., 295 N.C. 81, 85, 243 S.E.2d 756, 758
(1978) (citing Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distributors of North Wilkesboro, Inc.,
285 N.C. 467, 206 S.E.2d 141 (1974)); see also Hill v. Atlantic & N.C. R. Co., 143
N.C. 539, 573-77, 55 S.E. 854, 867-68 (1906).
374. State v. Lynch, 334 N.C. 402, 410, 432 S.E.2d 349, 352 (1993) ("'No court
has been more faithful to stare decisis.'" (quoting Rabon v. Rowan Memorial
Hosp., Inc., 269 N.C. 1, 20, 152 S.E.2d 485, 498 (1967)); see also Mims v. Mims,
305 N.C. 41, 54-55, 286 S.E.2d 779, 788 (1982); Mial v. Ellington, 134 N.C. 131,
139, 46 S.E. 961, 963-64 (1903).
375. The North Carolina Supreme Court states that "the compulsion of the
doctrine is, in reality, moral and intellectual, rather than arbitrary and
inflexible." Sidney Spitzer & Co. v. Commissioners of Franklin County, 188 N.C.
30, 32, 123 S.E. 636, 638 (1924); see also Wiles, 295 N.C. at 85, 243 S.E.2d at 758.
376. Shaw v. Moore, 49 N.C. 25, 27 (1856). Justice William J. Adams described
this language as a "special tribute" to the common law. William J. Adams,.
Evolution of Law in North Carolina, 2 N.C. L. REv. 133, 143 (1924).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss1/1
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Justice (later Chief Justice) Richard M. Pearson, in language
quoted with approval by Chief Justice William T. Faircloth and
Justice Robert M. Douglas, summarized an important principle of
the supreme court's stare decisis jurisprudence: "It is true, law
should be fixed and steady, but it is also true, it should be reasonable and right. The latter is the most important, because without
3 77
it the former object cannot be attained."

Similarly, Chief Justice Walter Clark observed that
[clourts can only maintain their authority by correcting their
errors to accord with justice, and the advance and progress of each
age. They should slough off that which is obsolete and correct
whatever is erroneous or contrary to the enlightenment and
sense
378
of justice of the age, and to the spirit of new legislation.
The North Carolina Supreme Court follows these principles
today. The supreme court holds that "nothing is settled until it is
settled right."379 The supreme court has many times held that the

court will not apply stare decisis "when it results in perpetuation
of error or grievous wrong."3 0 In addition, the court has
explained that it will alter judicially-created common law when
the court "deems it necessary in light of experience and reason. "38
377. Gaskill v. King, 34 N.C. 211, 223 (1851) (Pearson, C.J., dissenting), quoted
with approval in Malloy v. Fayettville, 122 N.C. 480, 492, 29 S.E. 880, 884 (1898)
(Faircloth, C.J., dissenting) and McIlhaney v. Southern Ry., 122 N.C. 995, 998,
30 S.E. 127, 127 (1898) (Douglas, J., concurring); see also Stare Decisis, 2 N.C.
J.L. 243 (1905); Perry v. Scott, 109 N.C. 374, 376 (1891) (quoting Gaskill, 34 N.C.
at 223 (Pearson, C.J., dissenting)).
378. State v. Falkner, 182 N.C. 848, 864, 108 S.E. 756, 763 (1921) (Clark, C.J.,
dissenting). For an in-depth biographical analysis of Chief Justice Clark and his
jurisprudence, see Willis P. Whichard, A Place for Walter Clark in the American
Judicial Tradition, 63 N.C. L. REV. 287 (1985).
379. Sidney Spitzer & Co. v. Commissioners of Franklin County, 188 N.C. 30,
32, 123 S.E. 636, 638 (1924); see also State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d
731, 733 (1949); Stare Decisis, supra note 377, at 244 ("We think we have heard
the present Chief Justice [(Chief Justice Walter Clark)] more than once say that
a case is not decided until it is decided right.").
380. Wiles v. Welparnel Constr. Co., 295 N.C. 81, 85, 243 S.E.2d 756, 758
(1978) (citing State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731 (1949)); see also
State v. Mobley, 240 N.C. 476, 487, 83 S.E.2d 100, 108 (1954); Patterson v.
McCormick, 177 N.C. 448, 456-57, 99 S.E. 401, 405 (1919); Mason v. Nelson
Cotton Co., 148 N.C. 492, 509-11, 62 S.E. 625, 631 (1908); Johnson v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 144 N.C. 410, 413, 57 S.E. 122, 123-24 (1907); Hill, 143 N.C. at
573-76, 55 S.E. at 867-68.
381. Mims v. Mims, 305 N.C. 41, 55, 286 S.E.2d 779, 788 (1982) (quoting State
v. Freeman, 302 N.C. 591, 594-95, 276 S.E.2d 450, 452 (1981)); see Stephenson v.
Rowe, 315 N.C. 330, 338 S.E.2d 301, 306 (1986) (citations omitted); see also Sides
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The continuing application of the contributory negligence doctrine is a perpetuation of error. Synonyms for "error" include "failure," "flaw," and "mistake." One cannot help but conclude that
these terms effectively describe the contributory negligence doctrine when considering the onerous criticism of the doctrine.3" 2
Antonyms of "error" include "accuracy" and "truth." These two
words undeniably cannot be associated with the contributory negligence doctrine. The all-or-nothing conclusion mandated by the
contributory negligence doctrine is an inaccurate result on its
face, and leaves a truthful description of the event at issue far
behind. More pointedly, one need know of only a few meritorious
plaintiffs denied any recovery against highly negligent defendants
by the contributory negligence doctrine to discover the meaning of
"grievous wrong."38 3
The experiences of other jurisdictions overwhelmingly point
to comparative negligence. North Carolina is in a good position to
adopt the comparative negligence doctrine on its own terms.
North Carolina has the benefit of the experiences of the forty-six
states that previously adopted a comparative negligence system.
Revealingly, not one jurisdiction that switched from a contributory negligence system to a comparative negligence system has
switched back. In making its decisions, the supreme court has
numerous times recognized the importance and influence of
trends in the common law as evidenced by the changing law of
other jurisdictions and scholarly works.38 4 These influences all
urge the adoption of the comparative negligence doctrine.
v. Duke Hosp., 74 N.C. App. 331, 344, 328 S.E.2d 818, 827 (the "genius" of the
common law "is not only its age and continuity, but its vitality and adaptability"
(citations omitted)), disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C. 331, 335 S.E.2d 13 (1985).
382. See supra part II.
383. See, e.g., Leland, supra note 277, at C1 (describing tragic situation where
North Carolina's contributory negligence doctrine prevented recovery against a
negligent defendant).
384. See, e.g., Mazza v. Medical Mutual Ins. Co., 311 N.C. 621, 624, 319 S.E.2d
217, 219 (1984) (noting "the recent trend of those courts considering the public
policy questions . . . allow[ing] insurance coverage for punitive damages"

(citations omitted)); Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hosp., Inc., 300 N.C.
295, 304, 266 S.E.2d 818, 823 (1980) ("In so holding, this jurisdiction once again
returns to the mainstream of American legal thought."); State v. Warren, 252
N.C. 690, 696, 114 S.E.2d 660, 666 (1960); Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co., 189
N.C. 120, 127, 126 S.E. 307, 311-12 (1925) (in overruling a 1921 case, the court
noted the weight of authority in other jurisdictions (citations omitted)) (cited in
and overruled in part by Nicholson, 300 N.C. at 299-300, 266 S.E.2d at 820); see
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss1/1
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Another factor favoring the rejection of the contributory negligence doctrine is that North Carolina's experience with the contributory negligence doctrine reveals that the contributory
negligence rule is not the strict tenant of North Carolina law that
a reading of the original Morrison statement indicates.38 5 Limitations on the rule considerably eroded the strict rule over the
years. 38 6 It is generally recognized that such limitations are
designed to lessen the harsh impact of the strict rule. North Carolina, through the efforts of both the General Assembly and the
supreme court, has slowly drifted away from a following of the
strict contributory negligence rule since the rule was first
announced. 87
Perhaps the most important factor urging the re-examination
and rejection of the contributory negligence doctrine is that the
grounds upon which the North Carolina Supreme Court based its
adoption of the contributory negligence doctrine have vanished.
As discussed supra, the supreme court based the adoption of the
contributory negligence doctrine on four rationales: (1) The
injured party "brought the injury upon himself"; (2) No rule
existed to allow for the apportionment of damages; (3) All other
American jurisdictions followed the doctrine; and (4) The plaintiff's negligence was "the proximate cause" of the injury, while the
defendant's negligence was not "the proximate cause."38 8 None of
these four rationales can withstand scrutiny today.
It cannot now be said that a contributorily negligent plaintiff
"brought the injury on himself." In reality, the injured plaintiff
and the negligent defendant brought the injuries on the plaintiff.
also Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 339, 328 S.E.2d at 824 ("In recent years, the rule has
come under increasing criticism from scholars." (citations omitted)).
One precedent leans the other way. In State v. Avery, 315 N.C. 1, 337 S.E.2d
786 (1985), the supreme court declined to "adopt the rule of twenty-eight states"
in relation to insanity as an affirmative defense. Id. at 18, 337 S.E.2d at 795.
The Avery court stated that "wecontinue to believe our rule to be the better view,
while recognizing that reasonable arguments can be made to the contrary." Id.
(citation omitted)). It is difficult to imagine, however, the supreme court finding
the contributory negligence doctrine "the better view."
385. See generally Juenger, supra note 2, at 24-28. For a description of the
Morrison case, see supra notes 21 - 30 and accompanying text.
386. For a description of these limitations, see supra part I.C.
387. For a discussion of the history of the contributory negligence doctrine in
North Carolina, including its several exceptions and limitations, see supra parts
I.A. and I.C.
388. See supra part I.B.
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To adhere to the "brought the injury on himself" rationale is to
adhere to a catchy phrase while ignoring reality and reason.
The second rationale upon which the supreme court based its
adoption of the contributory negligence doctrine is now patently
untenable. There is no doubt that there today exists a rule to
allow for the apportionment of damages. The comparative negligence doctrine exists in nearly every negligence system, both
within and without the United States.
The third rationale has similarly disappeared. While at the
time that the supreme court adopted the contributory negligence
doctrine all American jurisdictions followed the doctrine, forty-six
states have since realized the inequities of the doctrine and
rejected it. Today, nearly all American jurisdictions follow the
comparative negligence doctrine.
The fourth rationale was rejected as unsound long ago. Scrutiny reveals that a contributorily negligent plaintiff's negligence is
not "the proximate cause" of the plaintiff's injuries. Dean Prosser
observed that such an analysis "cannot be supported unless a
meaning is assigned to proximate cause which is found nowhere
else."38 9 For example, "[i]f two automobiles collide and injure a
bystander, the negligence of one driver is not held3 90to be a superseding cause which relieves the other of liability."
The supreme court repudiated such reasoning in 1922 in West
Construction Co. v. Atlantic Cost Line Railroad.3 9 1 The court
explained that "it is sufficient if [the plaintiff's] negligence is a
cause, or one of the causes, without which the injury would not
have occurred. If the plaintiff's negligence be the sole and only
cause of the injury it would not be contributory negligence at all,
but rather the source of a self-inflicted injury. "392 Thus, this
fourth rationale also is no longer a reasonable rationale for the
contributory negligence doctrine.
The North Carolina Supreme Court holds that "[in the event
that an application of a common law rule cannot achieve its aim,
... then adherence to precedent is the only justification in support
of the rule, and the courts are compelled to re-examine the common law doctrine."3 9 3 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in his
389. Prosser, supra note 2, at 468.
390. Id.
391. 184 N.C. 179, 113 S.E. 672 (1922).
392. Id. at 181.
393. State v. Freeman, 302 N.C. 591, 595, 276 S.E.2d 450, 453 (1981) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added); see also Wilson Lumber & Milling Co. v. Hutton, 159
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noted address, The Path of the Law, eloquently captured this principle.3 94 He explained that "[i]t is revolting to have no better reasons for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of
Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it
and the rule simply perwas laid down have vanished long since,
3 95
past."
the
of
sists from blind imitation
The stare decisis rules developed by the North Carolina
Supreme Court strike the proper balance in examining commonlaw rules. These rules, when considered in light of the factors discussed above, urge the review and rejection of the contributory
negligence doctrine.
B.

Judicial vs. Legislative Adoption of the Comparative
Negligence Doctrine

Litigants opposing the abrogation of the contributory negligence doctrine in other jurisdictions have argued that the courts
should simply defer the decision to the legislature. 3 9 6 Twelve
state supreme courts have rejected this contention. The states
adopting the comparative negligence doctrine by the judicial path
are Alaska, 39 7 California,3 98 Florida, 39 9 Illinois,40 0 Iowa, 4 0 1 Kentucky,4 0 2 Michigan, 40 3 Missouri, 40 4 New Mexico, 40 5 South Carolina,40 6 Tennessee, 40 7 and West Virginia. 40 The United States
N.C. 445, 448, 74 S.E. 1056, 1057 (1912) ("when the reason ceases, the law
ceases" (Clark, C.J., dissenting)); A.A.F. Seawell, Keeping the Law Alive, 25 N.C.
L. REV. 365, 374 (1947) (Justice Seawell explains that "[t]he validity of precedent
depends on the soundness of its reason and its expression of living truth within
the frame of the case in hand.").
394. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457
(1897).
395. Id. at 469.
396. A well-read law review article on this subject is Comments, supra note 2;
see also ScHwARTz, supra note 207, §§ 1.5, 1.6.
397. Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975).
398. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975).
399. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
400. Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886 (Ill. 1981).
401. Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1982).
402. Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984).
403. Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 275 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. 1979).
404. Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983).
405. Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234 (N.M. 1981).
406. Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 399 S.E.2d 783 (S.C. 1991).
407. McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992). For a thorough article
examining the debate over comparative negligence and contributory negligence
in Tennessee, see Mutter, supra note 2.
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40 9 SimiSupreme Court has also rejected a similar contention.
larly, the North Carolina Supreme Court's stare decisis jurisprudence repudiates such an argument.
When a common-law rule has not been codified, the North
Carolina Supreme Court has full authority to alter or abolish the
rule. 4 10 The supreme court has rejected the argument that the
court should simply defer to the General Assembly in changing
the common law several times. 41 ' The supreme court's stare decisis jurisprudence provides that the only issue where the supreme

408. Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979).
409. See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 409-11 (1975)
(unanimous opinion rejecting argument that switch to pure comparative
negligence in maritime collision cases should be left to Congress).
410. See State v. Freeman, 302 N.C. 591, 594, 276 S.E.2d 450, 452 (1981)
("Absent a legislative declaration, [the North Carolina Supreme Court] possesses
the authority to alter judicially created common law when it deems it necessary
in the light of experience and reason." (citation omitted)); State v. Wiseman, 130
N.C. 726, 41 S.E. 884 (1902); Mims v. Mims, 305 N.C. 41, 55, 286 S.E.2d 779, 788
(1982); see also State v. Josey, 328 N.C. 697, 704, 403 S.E.2d 479, 483 (1991) ("We
have the power to change the common law rule.").
411. See Mims v. Mims, 305 N.C. 41, 55, 286 S.E.2d 779, 788-89 (1982)
("[F]rom time to time when this Court has been convinced that changes in the
way society or some of its institutions functioned demanded a change in the law,
it rejected older rules which the Court itself developed in order that justice under
the law might be better achieved. These decisions were sometimes made in the
face of arguments that such changes ought to be made, if at all, by the
legislature." (citing Nicholson, 300 N.C. at 295, 266 S.E.2d at 818; Great Am. Ins.
Co. v. C.G. Tate Constr. Co., 303 N.C. 387, 279 S.E.2d 769 (1981); Rabon, 269
N.C. at 1, 152 S.E.2d at 486; Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201, 236 S.E.2d 787
(1977); Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 222 S.E.2d 412 (1976))).
Examples of cases in which the supreme court surveyed the common law of
other jurisdictions and, finding absolutely no change in the common law, noted
that the sought-after change must therefore come from the legislature include
Gillikin v. Bell, 254 N.C. 244, 118 S.E.2d 609, 611 (1961) (the court surveyed the
common law of other states and determined that the cause of action that plaintiff
claimed was nowhere found in the common law, but noted that the legislature
could create such a cause of action if the legislature wished); Elliott v. Elliott, 235
N.C. 153, 69 S.E.2d 224, 227 (1952) (the court surveyed the common law, found
absolutely no support for abrogating a common-law rule, and noted that "this
Court does not make law"); and Scholtens v. Scholtens, 230 N.C. 149, 52 S.E.2d
350, 352 (1949) (same).
The supreme court's statement that it "does not make law" in Elliott and
Scholtens does not, of course, support adherence to the contributory negligence
doctrine. This language explains that the court will not make changes that are
not supported by the common law. In other words, the court will not, for
example, create a new cause of action that has absolutely no support in the
common law of other jurisdictions.
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court will refuse to exercise its power to change the common law
and will instead defer to the legislature are, in recognition of their
unique status, common-law rules regarding vested property
rights.4 1 2 Vested property rights, of course, are not affected by the
contributory negligence doctrine.
Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hospital41 3 is a recent
example of the supreme court's rejection of the deferment argument. In Nicholson, the court rejected the defendant's arguments
that "if [the court is] tempted to an 'activist' role in dealing with
[prior decisions of the court, the court] should rely on legislative
action rather than forsake . . 'stare decisis.' "414 The court stated
that this "argument overlooks the fact that this entire area of the
law has been developed by judicial decree." 4 15 The court noted
that the question at issue in Nicholson had been examined and
altered several times.4 1 6 The court noted also "the policy of modern law to expand liability in an effort to afford decent compensation ... to those injured by the wrongful conduct of others."4 1 v The
court concluded that "[i]n view of such a history of judicial activity, we do not believe legislative fiat is necessary. "418
412. See Bulova Watch Co., 285 N.C. at 473, 206 S.E.2d at 145 (A "decision,
subsequently concluded to have been erroneous, may properly be overruled when
such action will not disturb property rights previously vested in reliance on
earlier decisions."); Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hosp., Inc., 269 N.C. 1, 20, 152
S.E.2d 486, 498 (1967) (The North Carolina Supreme Court's policy "in matters
involving title to property [is]... to leave changes in the law to the legislature.");
Woodard v. Clark, 236 N.C. 190, 72 S.E.2d 433, 436 (1952) (leaving personal
property issue to the legislature); see also Mims, 305 N.C. at 55, 286 S.E.2d at
788.
413. 300 N.C. 295, 266 S.E.2d 818 (1980).
414. Nicholson, 300 N.C. at 304, 266 S.E.2d at 823.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id. at 300, 266 S.E.2d at 821 (citations omitted).
418. Id.
Justice A.A.F. Seawell made similar observations on this point. In
examining the role of the courts and the legislature in "keeping the law current,"
Justice Seawell explained that sometimes "emphasis on responsibility, and
sometimes priority, must carry the initiative to the courts." Seawell, supra note
393, at 367. He reasoned "that the field in which the need for adjustment is more
often felt, instances which advertise the existing inadequacy of out-moded rules
most frequently encountered, is peculiarly and traditionally that of the courtthe field of judge-made law." Id. at 367. The Contributory negligence doctrine
fits squarely within Justice Seawell's reasoning.
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Ten courts acquiesced to the legislative-deferment argument. 419 These cases, however, are easily differentiated from
North Carolina's situation. Two of the courts deferring to their
respective legislatures had to contend with statutes that some
argued implicitly codified the contributory negligence doctrine.42 °
There are North Carolina statutes that provide for the administration of the contributory negligence doctrine, and that mitigate
against its harshness,4 2 ' but none that codify the doctrine or prevent its rejection.422
419. See Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 456 A.2d 894, 905 (Md.
1983); Golden v. McCurry, 392 So. 2d 815, 817 (Ala. 1980); Codling v. Paglia, 298
N.E.2d 622, 630 (N.Y. 1973); Krise v. Gillund, 184 N.W.2d 405, 409 (N.D. 1971);
Bridges v. Union Pacific R.R., 488 P.2d 738, 740 (Utah 1971); Peterson v. Culp,
465 P.2d 876 (Ohio 1970); Johnston v. Tourangeau, 259 N.W. 187, 188-89 (Minn.
1935); McGraw v. Corrin, 303 A.2d 641, 644 (Del. 1973); Bissen v. Fuji, 466 P.2d
429, 431 (Haw. 1970); Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co., 177 N.W.2d 513, 516-17
(Wis. 1970).
Justice James H. Faulkner of the Alabama Supreme Court, dissenting,
stated that "[t]he majority's holding that, 'even though this Court has the
inherent power to change the common law rule of contributory negligence, it
should, as a matter of policy, leave any change . . . to the legislature' is like

shaking the clammy, lifeless, hand of another man. It has no meaning." Golden,
392 So. 2d at 819 (Faulkner, J., dissenting).
The legislatures in all but two of the ten states whose supreme courts
deferred the decision later adopted the comparative negligence doctrine.
420. See Golden, 392 So. 2d at 816-17; Bridges, 488 P.2d at 740; see also
Williams v. Delta Int'l Machinery Corp., 619 So. 2d 1330 (Ala. 1993).
North Carolina has a similar statute that provides that English common law
applies in North Carolina. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4-1 (1986). It has been long
recognized that this statute did not codify 1776 common law, but that it indicates
that such common law applies until modified or repealed by the General
Assembly or the supreme court. See Hall v. Post, 323 N.C. 259, 264, 372 S.E.2d
711, 714 (1988).
421. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-139 (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-126(c)
(1989); N.C. R. Civ. P. 7-8.
422. One statute bears particular mention. Under North Carolina's Tort
Claims Act, the state is liable for negligent acts of its agents under the same laws
governing a private person's liability. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-299.1 (1983)
(hereinafter "§ 143-299.1") states that "[c]ontributory negligence on the part of
the claimant ...shall be deemed a matter of defense on the part of the State ....
and... [the] State... shall have the burden of proving that the claimant ...was
guilty of contributory negligence." It is not clear whether § 143-299.1 codifies the
contributory negligence doctrine for claims against the state or whether it, like
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-139 (1983) (hereinafter "§ 1-139"), merely mitigates the
harshness of the doctrine by shifting the burden of proving the presence of
contributory negligence to the party asserting it as a defense.
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Taking the view that administrative and harshness-mitigating statutes prevent the supreme court from abrogating commonlaw doctrines would allow such doctrines to be codified without
actual ratification by the legislature. There are many problems
with such a view. One of the most alarming is that it would turn
legislative intent on its head to construe a legislator's vote in favor
of mitigating the harshness of a common-law doctrine as a vote in
favor of codifying the doctrine. There is no support for such a view
in the North Carolina Supreme Court's jurisprudence.4 23
The events precipitating the introduction and passage of § 143-299.1 exactly
mirror those causing the enactment of § 1-139. In 1883 the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that it was the plaintiff's burden to prove that the plaintiff
was not contributorily negligent in order for the plaintiff to recover against a
negligent defendant. See supra part I.C.3. This rule required the plaintiff to
show the absence of contributory negligence as a part of the plaintiff's case. The
1887 North Carolina General Assembly, recognizing the inequity of such a rule,
passed § 1-139 to provide that it is the defendant's burden to prove the plaintiff's
contributory negligence if the defendant asserts the contributory negligence
doctrine as a defense. See supra part I.C.3.
In 1955 the supreme court held that it was the plaintiff's burden to prove
that the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent in order to recover against the
state under the Tort Claims Act. Floyd v. North Carolina State Highway
Commission, 241 N.C. 461, 85 S.E.2d 703 (1955); see also MacFarlane v. Wildlife
Resources Commission, 244 N.C. 385, 93 S.E.2d 556 (1956). The 1955 General
Assembly, like the 1887 General Assembly, recognized the inequity of this rule,
and overruled MacFarlane and Floyd by statute, § 143-299.1. See Barney v.
North Carolina State Highway Commission, 282 N.C. 278, 192 S.E.2d 273
(1972). This historical similarity and the General Assembly's apparent intent in
enacting § 143-299.1 indicates that § 143-299.1 does not codify the contributory
negligence doctrine for suits against the state, but just makes it clear that the
party asserting the doctrine as a defense-the state-has the burden of proof,
and that it is not part of the plaintiff's case. See Tucker v. North Carolina
Highway & Public Works Comm'n, 274 N.C. 171, 100 S.E.2d 514, 519 (1957).
The language of § 143-299.1, though, is different than § 1-139's language, and
may be read to codify the doctrine for suits against the state. The second clause
of § 143-299.1 appears to accomplish all that § 1-139 entails, shifting the burden
to the one asserting the doctrine as a defense. It is arguable that the first clause
of § 143-299.1 is merely a preamble to the operative second clause, indicating
that contributory negligence is, in fact, a "defense," and not part of the plaintiff's
case. The answer to this question awaits resolution by the North Carolina
courts. In any event, § 143-299.1 does not codify the doctrine generally and in no
way impedes the ability of the supreme court to reject the contributory
negligence doctrine in the common law.
423. Similar statutes existed in the states whose supreme courts rejected the
contributory negligence doctrine. Moreover, none of the comparative fault bills
introduced in the General Assembly sought to amend these statutes. See supra
part III.C.1.
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Six of the courts deferring to their respective legislatures

made their decision to defer before the tide of jurisdictions made
the switch to the comparative negligence doctrine and thus did not
have the experience and reasoning of many other jurisdictions on
the issue to examine. The remaining two courts, Ohio and Maryland,-and nearly all of the other courts-deferring to their
respective legislatures do not follow the same stare decisis principles that the North Carolina Supreme Court follows. The Ohio
Supreme Court did not offer any rationale for its decision to
defer.424 In direct contrast to the stare decisis jurisprudence of
North Carolina, Maryland's high court has very often declined to
change the common law and expressly deferred to the Maryland
legislature.4 25
Litigants have argued that courts should merely defer to the
legislature on this issue because issues associated with the comparative negligence doctrine will need to be addressed. It is theoretically true that a legislature is in a better position to adopt a
set of rules for applying a new doctrine, for it can address all associated issues at once. This variation of the deferment argument
fails in practice, however, because legislatures, for the most part,
do not address issues beyond the rejection of the contributory negligence doctrine for the comparative negligence doctrine when
they progress their respective states to a comparative negligence
system by the legislative path. Such bills leave the vast majority
of issues associated with the comparative negligence doctrine to
the courts. Indeed, the several comparative negligence bills introduced in the North Carolina General Assembly left many questions for the courts to decide.426
The history of the comparative negligence bills addressed in
the North Carolina General Assembly during the 1980s provides
further reason for the North Carolina Supreme Court to reject the
deferment argument. The debates over these bills were impaired
by intensive lobbying on both sides, flawed insurance-cost studies,
424. Baab, 399 N.E.2d at 88. The Ohio court did cite a group of cases from the
late 1960s and early 1970s that deferred to their respective legislatures on the
issue. Id. at 88-89. These cases all came before the "stampede" to the
comparative negligence doctrine, and at least one of them, Maki v. Frelk, 239
N.E.2d 445 (Ill. 1968), was later overruled when the Illinois Supreme Court
judicially adopted the comparative negligence doctrine in Alvis v. Ribar, 421

N.E.2d 886 (Ill. 1981).
425. See Harrison, 456 A.2d at 903 (citing eleven such occasions).
426. For a description of the legislative history of the comparative negligence
bills in the North Carolina General Assembly, see supra part III.C.1.
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arguments over legislative procedure, arguments over legislators'
integrity, and posturing on unrelated issues. 42 7 There is little reason not to believe that future comparative negligence bills will be
met by similar influences. The deferment argument rests in large
part on the ability of the legislature to deliberately and thoughtfully address the several issues associated with the comparative
negligence doctrine. The comparative negligence bills, however,
raise influences which, as evidenced by the 1980s, sharply divide
legislators4 2 s and hamper the General Assembly's exercise of this
ability.
In this same vein, it should be noted that an argument can be
made that the General Assembly's several rejections of comparative negligence bills should be given some weight by the supreme
court in favor of retaining a contributory negligence system. This
argument's force, whatever it may be, is, however, nullified by the
influence of the debate-impairing factors discussed above, particularly the seemingly-alarming-but-flawed insurance-cost studies.4 29 Moreover, it is generally recognized that a legislature's
rejection of a bill is not always the same as the legislature's rejection of the doctrine or idea underlying the bill. Undeniably, legislators vote for or against a bill for a wide variety of reasons.
Of course, the General Assembly would remain free to
address any issues associated with the comparative negligence
doctrine following the doctrine's adoption by the supreme court. It
is important to note that the development of the contributory negligence doctrine and its associated rules has been a combined
effort between the North Carolina Supreme Court and the North
Carolina General Assembly.4 30 There is no reason why this part427. See supra part III.C.1. The unrelated issue referred to is superior court
appointments. See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
428. An amazingly high percentage of votes on this issue resulted either in a
tie or a difference of only two or three votes. See supra part III.C.1.
429. See supra part III.C.2.a. and footnotes 362 and 427 and accompanying
text.
430. See supra part I.C.
At the turn of the century, the Honorable George Rountree, in a speech to
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill law class, addressed the growth
of the common law. He reminded his audience that
it is necessary to remember that the law is not only a body of rules, but
that this body is not lifeless-it is a living organism, ever growing,
expanding, developing-constantly shedding outworn forms and
adopting newer and more efficient means of administering justice
between man and man-and that this growth is due as well to the
action of the courts as to that of the legislature.
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nership could not successfully continue with the comparative negligence doctrine.
The supreme court's language in State v. Freeman bears
repeating at this point: "In the event that an application of a common law rule cannot achieve its aim,.. . then adherence to precedent is the only justification in support of the rule, and the courts
are compelled to re-examine the common law doctrine." 4 3 1 A decision to merely defer to the legislature on this issue will not comport with the meaningful stare decisis rules that have served the
supreme court and the state of North Carolina well for two centuries. 4 32 As Justice A.A.F. Seawell explained: "It is inconceivable
that justice should lag when the power, the opportunity, the
necessity, and the propriety all meet and wait upon the
occasion."

43 3

C. Summary: Judicial Restraint in the Contributory
Negligence Crucible
Judicial restraint is very important, both to maintain the
integrity of the courts and to preserve our balanced system of government. There is no question that the justices of the North Carolina Supreme Court must exercise judicial restraint in carrying
out their duties, including their responsibilities as common-law
judges. This restraint, though, is not a paralyzing straightjacket.
As the supreme court has recognized, there occasionally comes a
time when a common-law doctrine must be re-examined and
altered. The supreme court, over the period of its existence, has
carefully developed rules within its stare decisis jurisprudence to
George Rountree, The Development of the Law, 1 N.C. L. J. 155, 157 (1900)
(Annual Address to the Law Class of the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill on May 4, 1900).
Justice A.A.F. Seawell made similar observations on this point. In
examining the role of the courts and the legislature in "keeping the law current,"
Justice Seawell explained that sometimes "emphasis on responsibility, and
sometimes priority, must carry the initiative to the courts." Seawell, supra note
393, at 367. He reasoned "that the field in which the need for adjustment is more
often felt, instances which advertise the existing inadequacy of out-moded rules
most frequently encountered, is peculiarly and traditionally that of the courtthe field of judge-made law." Id. at 367. The contributory negligence doctrine
fits squarely within Justice Seawell's reasoning.
431. State v. Freeman, 302 N.C. 591, 595, 276 S.E.2d 450, 453 (1981) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
432. For additional discussion of these rules, see supra parts V.A. and IV.C.
433. Seawell, supra note 393, at 371.
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let the sitting justices know when this time has come.4 34 These
rules are not rules of convenience. The supreme court has not spoken of them in permissive terms. 4 35 These rules are as much a

part of the supreme court's jurisprudence as the court's most-cited
common-law rules. Their appropriately-infrequent operation does
not diminish their importance or force. Judicial restraint must be
measured not only by close adherence to statutory language and
legislative intent, and dedication to stare decisis jurisprudence
requiring devotion to precedent, but also by the observance of considered stare decisis jurisprudence indicating when a common-law
doctrine must be re-examined and altered.
The North Carolina Supreme Court's considered stare decisis
jurisprudence indicating when a common-law doctrine must be reexamined and altered is straightforward. When the rationale for
a common-law rule has vanished or become unreasonable, and the
only justification for adhering to the rule is precedent, or when
experience and reason urge it, the North Carolina Supreme Court
will re-examine the rule.436 When the continued adherence to a
common-law rule is a perpetuation of error or grievous wrong, or
when experience and reason reveal that justice under the law can
be better achieved by the alteration or rejection of the rule, the
North Carolina Supreme Court will alter or reject the rule.437 As
explained above, the North Carolina Supreme Court's stare decisis
jurisprudence calls for the court to re-examine and reject the contributory negligence doctrine.
CONCLUSION

The contributory negligence doctrine is unjust and outmoded.
It is nearly-universally recognized as such. Consequently, forty434. For a discussion of these rules, see supra parts IV.A. and IV.B.
435. See, e.g., State v. Freeman, 302 N.C. 591, 594-95, 276 S.E.2d 450, 453
(1981) ("compelled"); Wiles v. Welparnel Constr. Co., 295 N.C. 81, 85, 243 S.E.2d
756, 758 (1978) ("will"); State v. Mobley, 240 N.C. 476, 487, 83 S.E.2d 100, 108
(1954) ("never"); State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 767, 51 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1949)

("will").
436. See supra parts IV.A. and IV.B.; State v. Freeman, 302 F.2d 591, 595, 276
S.E.2d 450, 453 (1981).
437. See supra parts IV.A. and IV.B.; Mims v. Mims, 305 N.C. 41, 54-55, 286
S.E.2d 779, 788-89 (1982); see also Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the
United States, 50 HAnv. L. REv. 4, 8 (1936) ("the law itself is something better
than its bad precedents, and to open the way for recognition that the bad
precedent must on occasion yield to the better reason").
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1996

71

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 1
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:1

six states, the United States Supreme Court, and nearly all civilized countries have rejected the doctrine.
The comparative negligence doctrine makes all parties
responsible for the results of the party's conduct. It offers an effective solution to the several difficulties associated with the contributory negligence doctrine. The jurisdictions rejecting the
contributory negligence doctrine adopted the comparative negligence doctrine. None have switched back.
Both the North Carolina Supreme Court and the North Carolina General Assembly have the power to reject the contributory
43 8
negligence doctrine for the comparative negligence doctrine.
This article's concentration on the common-law development of
438. Ultimately, the North Carolina Supreme Court or the North Carolina
General Assembly will have to decide which type of comparative negligence
system to adopt-pure, "less than or equal to" modified, "less than" modified, or
"slight/gross" modified. For a description of each of these types, see supra part
IIIA. There are several law review articles and treatises that describe the
merits of each of the types of comparative negligence very well. See, e.g., WOODS,
supra note 13, at 85-94; SCHwARrz, supra note 207, at 45-76; Mutter, supra note
2, at 245-58. Thus, their work is not repeated here. A few, brief notes on this
issue, however, are important to North Carolina's examination of this issue.
The pure comparative negligence system is recognized as the most equitable
and just system. See supra note 219 - 227 and accompanying text. Nearly all of
the courts that have adopted the comparative negligence System have chosen-the
pure system. It is also generally recognized that the "slight/gross" system has a
wide variety of problems and is very similar to the contributory negligence
doctrine. See supra notes 235 - 238 and accompanying text.
Most state legislatures adopting the comparative negligence doctrine have
chosen one of the modified comparative negligence systems. It is generally
acknowledged that the selection of a modified system is the result of political
compromise. See supra note 228. Nearly all of the comparative negligence bills
introduced in the North Carolina General Assembly provided for the "less than"
modified comparative negligence system. See supra part III. C. 1. Other states'
experience with the "less than" system, however, reveals some difficulties with
such a system. Although in theory not significantly different than the "less than
or equal to" system, the "less than" system is disfavored because juries
sometimes gravitate towards finding the parties equally at fault-fifty/fifty-and
intend to award the plaintiff half of the plaintiff's damages and, instead,
unintentionally leave the plaintiff with no recovery. See WooDs, supra note 13,
§ 1:11, at 28; ScHwARTz, supra note 207, § 2.1, at 32. Experience with the "less
than" system has so far led nine states that initially adopted the "less than"
system to switch to the "less than or equal to" system. WOODS, supra note 13,
§ 1:11, at 28-29.
Thus, based on the analysis presented by the courts and commentators
examining the issue, and on other states' experience with the "less than" system,
North Carolina should adopt either a pure comparative negligence system or a
"less than or equal to" modified comparative negligence system.
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negligence law in North Carolina is not meant to minimize the
importance of the General Assembly's ability to act on this issue.
The General Assembly should pass a comparative fault bill.
Indeed, the General Assembly is arguably the preferential body to
deal with the issue. This is because the General Assembly can
provide for issues associated with the comparative negligence doctrine in one bill, whereas it may take some time for the supreme
court to address such issues. This arguably-preferential status,
however, is not an exclusive status.
The contributory negligence doctrine is a creature of the common law in North Carolina. Experience and reason, including
consideration of the overwhelming criticism levelled at the doctrine, reveal that continued adherence to the doctrine is a perpetuation of error and a grievous wrong. Tellingly, all of the
rationales upon which the supreme court adopted the doctrine
have long-since vanished. The stare decisis jurisprudence carefully developed by the North Carolina Supreme Court over the
past two centuries urges the court to re-examine and reject the
contributory negligence doctrine. The supreme court should not
make this change lightly, but it should make this change.
Either the North Carolina General Assembly or the North
Carolina Supreme Court should, without delay, reject the contributory negligence doctrine and adopt the comparative negligence
doctrine in its stead. The citizens of North Carolina deserve no
less.
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